


THE ALABAMA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY



Vol. XXXVI

SPRING, 1974

No. 1

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Milo B. Howard, Jr., Editor

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LACHLAN MCGILLIVRAY: A SCOT ON THE ALABAMA FRONTIER

by

Mary Ann Oglesby Neeley

Most Alabamians are familiar with Alexander McGillivray, the Creek leader who did so much to help his people maintain their lands in the decade following the American Revolution. His father, Lachlan McGillivray, is less well known except in regard to the glamorized story of his marriage to the half-Indian-half-French girl, Sehoy Marchand. Lachlan was an interesting and influential man in his own time who has been somewhat neglected by historians. Alabama's Albert Pickett discussed Lachlan to some extent, but he did not go into great detail regarding Lachlan's political and business achievements. Both Lachlan and the mother of his children, Sehoy, influenced their son, Alexander. The specifics concerning the parents help to explain the later actions of the offspring.

The traditional story of Lachlan and Sehoy was told by Pickett, and subsequent historians, including Thomas Owen, John Caughey, and Arthur P. Whittaker, have followed his example. The early Alabama historian described Lachlan as the son of wealthy parents of Dunmaglass, Scotland. When he was sixteen, the boy ran away, sailed for Charleston with a shilling in his pocket, the clothes he wore, "a red head, a stout frame, an honest heart, a fearless disposition, and cheerful spirits which seldom became depressed." This dauntless lad, once in Carolina, joined and worked with a band of traders who paid him with a jack knife. Lachlan traded the implement for deerskins which he then bartered in Charleston, and thus launched himself into a career as a trader. The immigrant soon established a trading post in the vicinity of Fort Toulouse, the French enclave at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers in the heart of the Creek country.¹

A few miles above Fort Toulouse, at the Hickory Ground, lived an Indian girl named Sehoy Marchand. Sehoy, according to Pickett, was the daughter of Captain Marchand, a com-

¹Albert J. Pickett, *History of Alabama and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi* (1851; rpt. Birmingham: Birmingham Book and Magazine Co., 1962), 342-343.

mander of Fort Toulouse who had been killed during a mutiny of his troops in 1722. The mother of this girl was also named Sehoy and was a member of the powerful, elite Wind Clan.²

Pickett related that the younger Sehoy was sixteen when Lachlan arrived in the Creek land, and was "cheerful in countenance, bewitching in looks, and graceful in form." As her father was a dark-complexioned Frenchman, she did not look light enough for a half-blood. Soon Lachlan and Sehoy "joined their destinies in marriage according to the ceremony of the country." The two lived at Little Tallassee, four miles above Wetumpka, on the east bank of the Coosa, while Lachlan's trading venture, enhanced by his marriage into the Wind Clan, continued to expand.³

So has the romantic story of the parents of Alexander McGillivray been reiterated since Pickett wrote in the early 1850's. Yet, there is some doubt to be cast on the validity of this account. Pickett placed Lachlan's arrival in America in the wrong location, and it was under somewhat different circumstances.

The McGillivray clan was of celtic origin, descended from a warrior named Gillivray whose stronghold had been Dunmaglass. There was a McGillivray at the battle of Culloden who was wounded and ordered killed by Cumberland. It was from the clan seat in Invernesshire, a region strong in Stuart sentiment, that Lachlan came.⁴ Pickett was correct in stating this, but the South Carolina colony was not the young immigrant's port of entry.

The new colony to the south of Carolina, Georgia, was having problems. Following its settlement in 1733, the Trustees discovered that some of the "useful poor" from England were inclined to be "useless" in the New World, so they determined to send over some Scottish Highlanders and persecuted Germans. To procure the necessary Highlanders, Lieutenant Hugh McKay and Captain George Dunbar were commissioned to recruit the prescribed number of one hundred and fifty men, women, and children. These people were enlisted in the vicinity

²*Ibid.*, 343.

³*Ibid.*, 343, 344.

⁴Thomas Innes, ed., *The Scottish Tartans* (London: Johnston and Bacon, 1969), 68.

of Inverness. Some who signed for the voyage paid their own passage and that of their servants; some went as indentured servants to the Trust. In all, one hundred and sixty-three persons sailed on the *Prince of Wales* from Inverness, October 20, 1735. On board were three McGillivrays: Archibald, Farquar, and Lachland.⁵

The ship arrived in Tybee Roads off Savannah on January 10, 1736. Only one of the McGillivrays was a paying passenger: Archibald was fifteen and had a grant of fifty acres. Farquar and Lachlan were not so fortunate. Farquar, age thirty, came as a servant of J. Cuthbert, and Lachlan, sixteen, was the servant of "Jo. Machintosh, Holmes' son." Apparently, Jo. left the Georgia colony to settle in Carolina in December, 1740.⁶ It is possible that Lachlan continued into Carolina with Mackintosh and from there began his life as a trader.

Thomas Woodward in his *Reminiscences* asserted that Lachlan was given his start in the Indian trade by Malcolm McPherson, and that McGillivray came into the Creek country in the company of John Tate and Daniel McDonald. By his own account, Lachlan received an Indian trading license from South Carolina in 1744 for commerce with the Upper Creeks.⁷

Among the Creeks, Lachlan met the Indian, Sehoy, who already had a daughter by McPherson. The girl did have "powerful connections" through her clan, but there is reason to doubt that she was half-French. Woodward flatly denied her white blood, asserting that she was a full-blooded Tuskegee woman. J. D. Driesbach in his letters to Lyman Draper also said that Sehoy was a Tuskegee woman of non-mixed blood. Some credence may be given these accounts as there may never

⁵Allen D. Candler, ed., *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia* (Atlanta: Franklin-Turner Co., 1905), III, 387 (Hereafter referred to as Col. Rec. Ga.); John Patterson MacLean, *An Historical Account of the Settlement of Scotch Highlanders in America* (Cleveland: Helman-Taylor Co., 1900), 150-151; E. Merton Coulter and Albert B. Saye, eds., *A List of the Early Settlers of Georgia* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1949), 83.

⁶MacLean, *Historical Account*, 151; Coulter and Saye, eds., *A List of Early Settlers*, 83, 85.

⁷Thomas Woodward, *Reminiscences of the Creek or Muskoghe Indians* (1859; rpt. Mobile: Southern University Press, 1865), 52; William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, May 21, 1750-August 7, 1754* (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958), 518 (Hereafter referred to as Col. Rec. S.C.).

have been a Marchand serving as commander at Toulouse. There was a Captain Marchand de Courcelle stationed at Mobile, and it was from his detachment that troops for Toulouse were selected. This man, however, was still being mentioned in records of the Mobile colony ten years after the mutiny at the fort.⁸

Lachlan and Sehoy established a relationship from which three children survived childhood: Jeannet, Sophia, and Alexander. The trader built a home and planted an apple orchard at Little Tallassee, a few miles up the Coosa River from Otciapofa (the Hickory Ground.)⁹

McGillivray's career as a trader continued, and a 1750 South Carolina list of licensed Creek traders included his name. He demonstrated his usefulness to the colonial government in various ways during the years. In 1751, he wrote to the South Carolinian, William Pinckney, that the oft-mentioned rumors of Creek-Cherokee hostilities were becoming a reality as the Creeks had killed seven or eight Cherokees and were searching for others. McGillivray labeled the Cherokees the aggressors for their killing of some Creeks the previous summer.¹⁰

The trader then reported on the re-building and strengthening of the French Fort Toulouse. Built in 1717 as a trading center and an advanced outpost in the French-English rivalry for the control of the continent, the fort was not a fortification designed for either offensive or defensive action against the Indians. The natives, in their efforts to insure their lands and well-being, shifted their favors from one European power to another. Their invitation to the French to establish the fort was an example of this strategy. In 1751, the French renovated the fort in their continuing exertions to influence the Creeks,

⁸Woodward *Reminiscences*, 53-54; J. D. Driesbach to Lyman Draper, Draper Manuscripts, Series V, Vol. I, p. 1, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (Microfilm in possession of Dr. F. L. Owsley, Jr., Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama); John Stuart to George Germaine, Oct. 6, 1777, PRO, CO 5/79, p. 61 (Microfilm, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); Daniel H. Thomas, "Fort Toulouse," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XXII (1960), 160.

⁹Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 345; John R. Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors* (1922; rpt. New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1970), 242.

¹⁰McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 129; Lachlan McGillivray to William Pinckney, Dec. 18, 1751, in *ibid.*, 215-216.

and as English-French antagonisms steadily increased. Lachlan wrote that

The French at the Allebawmaw have completed their fort which is a pretty strong one; they have a boat come up lately deep loaded with a Priest, Popery, and Brandy. . . . Lachlan went on to relate that the head men of the Upper and Lower Creeks had been invited to Mobile to receive presents. He also reported hearing that "a great Number of Men arrived lately at Mobile (supposed to be Soldiers) which gives the Indians a good deal of Umbrage."¹¹

It is evident that Lachlan was acting not only as a trader, but also as an observer and representative of the colonial administration. The Creek-Cherokee hostilities continued, and in 1753, Governor James Glen of South Carolina instigated moves to end the troubles. At a conference in Charleston, Lachlan acted as interpreter for the Creeks. In 1754, he reported to Glen on the success of the peace mediations.

The Peace you made between this Nation Creek and the Cherokees shews a very promising aspect for last winter they met in the hunting ground, eat, drank, and smoaked together, and a few days ago there was several Head Men and Warriors set out from this Nation for the Cherokees in order to confirm the Peace.¹²

The South Carolina governor was informed in the same letter that there was some difficulty between the Creeks and the Choctaws. McGillivray illustrated one of the aspects of European tactics in North America with his explanation that the French were "endeavoring to make up the Breach but I hope they will not succeed." The English often pursued a policy of encouraging Indian tribal hostilities as this tended to divert the natives' animosities from themselves. The French, though, frequently encouraged peace between the tribes. Too, in 1754, the French needed Creek allies other than those living in the immediate Fort Toulouse area. The Scottish trader in his

¹¹McGillivray to Pinckney, Dec. 18, 1751, in McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S. C.*, 216; Thomas, "Fort Toulouse," 141-152; Bienville, "Memoir on Louisiana," in Dunbar Rowland and Albert G. Sanders, eds., *Mississippi Provincial Archives, 1704-1743, French Dominion* (Jackson: Press of Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1932), 512.

¹²McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 388; Lachlan McGillivray to Gov. James Glen, April 14, 1754, in *ibid.*, 501-502.

letter to Glen exemplified the English approach. It was expedient that there be peace between the Creeks and Cherokees, who were English allies, but it was not an urgent matter that the Creeks and Choctaws, who were strongly Francophile, be on friendly terms.¹³

In 1754, McGillivray protested the South Carolina Council's granting a trading license in some of his towns to another trader. In stating his case, the petitioner pointed out that

he gave no cause of complaint to the Indians or his fellow traders and kept the Indians of his Towns in good Order and well affected to this Government, and that he has upon all Occasions exerted himself in the Indian Nation for the publick Good even to the Neglect and Detriment of his own Business is a fact well known to all the Traders in that Nation. . . .

Lachlan reminded the officials of his work as linguist for which he received no reward and that the reason he was not in town in June to re-apply for his license was that he was on public business. One of the towns whose license he lost was his own home, "Weetomkee, Old Town, alias Little Tallassee." The council, on consideration of the petition, withdrew the other trader's permit and in doing so reinstated McGillivray's.¹⁴

During the French and Indian War, McGillivray took part in various efforts to thwart French designs. He wrote Governor William Lyttleton of South Carolina in 1758 that the Upper Creeks had proposed an expedition against a French fort on the Mississippi. The trader had forwarded powder and ball to aid the Indians in their mission.¹⁵ In 1763, the English worries concerning the French in America ended with the defeat of the latter and their withdrawal from the continent. McGillivray's affairs prospered as he rose to further prominence among the traders.

In 1775, James Adair, a trader to the Chickasaws, dedicated his *The History of the American Indian* to Lachlan

¹³McGillivray to Glen, April 14, 1754, in McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 502; John E. Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Frontier* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944), 30-31.

¹⁴McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 518.

¹⁵McGillivray to Sir William Henry Lyttleton, July 13, 1758, Lyttleton Papers, 1756-1760, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Xeroxed copies in possession of author).

McGillivray, George Croghan, and George Galphin; all three men were active on the frontier. Adair lauded them for

Your distinguished abilities — your acquaintance with the North American Indian language, rites and customs — your long application and service in the dangerous sphere of an Indian life and your successful management of the savage natives. . . .¹⁶

The author described Lachlan McGillivray as "humane and intelligent" and acclaimed both Galphin and Lachlan as "sensible, public-spirited, and judicious." He credited the traders with keeping the Creeks from joining the Cherokees in their attacks on the English in 1760-1761. In recommending either McGillivray or Galphin for the position of Indian superintendent, Adair stated that no one had as much influence with the dangerous "Muskoghe" as they.¹⁷ Although Lachlan was never appointed to the office, his influence and esteem among the traders are attested to be Adair's proposal.

McGillivray did not confine his activities to those of a trader, nor did he spend his whole time in the Indian Country. In 1749, as a resident of Augusta, he petitioned the Council of Georgia for one hundred acres of land on which he proposed to build a grist mill; the request was granted. Lachlan continued to ask for grants and usually received what he desired. In 1755, he was granted a lot in Hardwicke, and in 1756, five hundred acres on the Little Ogeechee River. From 1756 to 1762, he was the recipient of eight lots (some in Savannah and some in Augusta) and over seven thousand acres of land. In January, 1761, he stated that he owned forty-nine slaves.¹⁸

The trader-planter was recognized as a prominent citizen in the Georgia colony by various appointments to public office. In March, 1757, he became justice of the peace for the districts of Halifax and Augusta; on November 7, 1768, the Council of Georgia elected him as a member of the General Assembly for Halifax and Parish St. George. He was named commissioner

¹⁶Samuel Cole Williams, ed., *Adair's History of the American Indian* (Nashville: National Society of Colonial Dames of America in Tennessee, 1953), xxxiii.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 299, 393.

¹⁸Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VI, 294; VII, 347, 344; Silas Emmett Lucas, Jr., *Index to the Headright and Bounty Grants of Georgia* (Vidalia, Ga.: Georgia Genealogical Reprints, 1970), n.p.; Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VIII, 460-461.

of roads for Northwest Road "as far as Christ Church extends" on June 29, 1780.¹⁹

As the colonies moved toward a break with Great Britain and revolution, many Scots in America retained their loyalty to the Crown while others followed the course of the patriots. Lachlan took the path of the loyalists. In 1774, he signed a petition objecting to the method used for drawing up resolutions by "pretended advocates for liberties in America." In all the colonies at this time, non-mercantile elements were trying to "drive a reluctant minority of merchants into a sacrifice of trading interests for a good desired only by the former."²⁰ Lachlan McGillivray was not willing to destroy his ties with the British Empire.

Because of his pro-English sympathies, Lachlan was treated severely by the Georgians at the close of the war. The executive Council ordered his property appraised on June 19, 1783, and on June 24, 1783, the property was ordered sold. On July 15, the House of Assembly requested the governor to send to the executives and legislatures of all the states a list of persons issued with an Act of Attainder, Banishment, and Confiscation. Lachlan's name was fourth on this list which was headed by James Wright, the former royal governor. Besides banishment, Lachlan lost an estimated \$100,000 in property. At the fall of Savannah and the departure of the British, McGillivray went back to Scotland and was living in Dunmaglas as late as 1799.²¹

¹⁹Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VII, 505; X, 646; Lilla M. Hawes, ed., *Collection of Georgia Historical Society* (Savannah: Georgia Historical Society, 1952), X, 112.

²⁰George Gillman Smith, *The Story of Georgia: 1732-1860* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1968), 224; George White, *Historical Collections of Georgia* (1855; rpt. Danielsville, Ga.: Heritage Paper, 1968), 48-49; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution: 1763-1776* (New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., 1957), 6.

²¹Allen D. Candler, ed., *The Revolutionary Records of Georgia* (Atlanta: Franklin-Turner Co., 1908), 506-507; Georgia Statutory Laws, Record of the States, Ga. B2, July 15, 1783, n.p. (Microfilm, Ralph B. Draughton Library, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.); Arthur Preston Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1783-1789, 1789-1793," *North Carolina Historical Review*, V (1928), 181; Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 419; John Innerarity to William Panton, March 12, 1799, in Marie Taylor, "William Panton," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XIV (1935), 118.

Although he did not take his family to Scotland with him, Lachlan had made some provisions for his son through the years. In 1759 and 1762, he requested and received grants of land for Alexander in Georgia. Thomas Woodward did not think that Alexander was literate, but a magazine of 1790 claimed that the elder McGillivray had the younger educated in Charleston and Savannah. Pickett and Woodward differ as to the circumstances and whereabouts of his children at the time of the last battle of Savannah. Woodward stated that Lachlan left the Creek Nation with Sophia and Alexander, but he was forced to send them back in the custody of a slave because of the American strength around the beleaguered town. Pickett states that Sophia, who was married and had a son, was in the city with her father during the siege. Alexander was, by this time, a British agent among the Creeks and participating in Indian assaults on the Georgia frontier settlements. It is, therefore, unlikely that he was sent back to the Indian country in the care of his father's slaves. He was an independent young man engaged in activities of his own.²²

Lachlan McGillivray, during his years among the Indians, developed an understanding of the problems confronting the natives because of their contact with the whites. One of the most serious of these was the use of hard liquor by the tribes. A contemporary author, Alexander Hewatt, commenting on the decreasing Indian population, blamed it on reduction of hunting grounds, European encouragement of tribal animosities, smallpox, the Indian slave trade, and, most fatally, the introduction of "spiritous liquors." Lachlan, too, thought liquor very damaging to the natives. In a letter to Governor Glen in 1754, McGillivray wrote

The Indians are well affected and a general peace and Quietness resides among them, excepting what Disturbances is occasioned by immoderate Quantities of Rum brought among them. Which is a stop put to, would very

²²Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VIII, 123-124, 647; *The Universal Asylum and Columbin Magazine*, Sept., 1790, William Augustus Bowles File, Albert J. Pickett MSS. Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Ala.; Woodward, *Reminiscences*, 53; Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 418; Mary Ann Neeley, "Alexander McGillivray, Diplomatic Leader of the Creeks: 1783-1793 (unpublished Master's thesis, Auburn University, 1973), 25, 28-29, 33.

much contribute towards a good Harmony among the Indians.²³

In a letter to Governor Lyttleton in 1759, McGillivray reported on the deaths of several of the Chickasaws "of small-pox owing to an immoderate use of spiritous liquors, bathing in cold water and drinking freely thereof."²⁴

The frontier Indian traders were a hardy breed, looking for personal gain and achievement but with an interest in the Indians as a people to be both exploited and loved. Lachlan McGillivray was one of these who gained importance in the development of the Alabama-Georgia frontier. It is detracting from the real personality and character of the man to associate him only in regards to an Indian love affair and the accomplishments of his son. The older McGillivray, through his astuteness in dealing with both the natives and the whites, accrued money and status. Because of his loyalty to the English Crown, he lost not only these but his family as well. His willingness to sacrifice his life's work because of his beliefs speaks for the character of this man who arrived in America as an indentured servant.

²³Alexander Hewatt, *An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia* (1779; facsimile rpt. Spartenburg: The Reprint Company, 1962), II, 272-279; McGillivray to Glen, April 14, 1754 in McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 501-502.

²⁴McGillivray to Lyttleton, May 15, 1759, Lyttleton Papers.

ALABAMA TOWN PRODUCTION DURING THE ERA OF
GOOD FEELINGS

by

Stuart Seely Sprague

The successful conclusion of the War of 1812 triggered the first town promotion boom in America. The battles of The Thames and Horseshoe Bend made large areas of the Old West safe for settlement. Though most of this land was sold by the acre, a growing number of enterprising men, varying from individual farmers to bands of experienced speculators, saw the advantage of buying land by the square mile, platting it, and selling it in small sections as town lots and out lots. This was a national movement, yet its Alabama manifestations have been all but overlooked.

From 1815 to 1819 a bubble of economic optimism remained unbroken. The idea of a city rising out of the wilderness did not seem far fetched to a generation that has seen Pittsburgh, Lexington, Cincinnati, Louisville and St. Louis do just that. A sizeable number of the known new towns were platted in the South. The proportion would be even higher if runs of Southern newspapers of the period, the prime source of such information, were as full as that of Northern papers. Yet despite these gaps one can say confidently that of the four states and territories in which the planning of would-be cities was most noticeable, two were Southern: Kentucky¹ and Alabama.

It was the *Mobile Gazette* that carried the poem that best epitomized the spirit of the get rich quick, instant city mania:²

SOUTHERN SPECULATIONS

What own a city! you exclaim,
Yes own the spot, that's just the same,

¹For Kentucky see Stuart Seely Sprague, "Town Making in the Era of Good Feelings: Kentucky 1814-1820," *The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* (forthcoming).

²*Mobile Gazette* quoted in the *Dayton Ohio Watchman*, June 11, 1818, verses 4-6, 8, 10, 12.

On which the place must stand;
For if on maps its once laid down,
It is a genuine a town,
As any in the land.

Town-making, now is quite a trade,
Of which the rules are ready made,
For those who stand in need;
Thus when a sport is intended,
If these ingredients be blended,
It cannot but succeed.

First choose an elevated bluff,
Just where the river's deep enough,
For ships of larger mould;
(If there should be a bar below,
O'er which the vessels cannot go,
The fact need not be told).

The most important point perhaps,
Lies in the drawing of the maps;
The painter there must try
By mingling yellow, red and green,
To make the most delightful scene,
That ever met the eye.

Of this obscure spot' you may swear,
There never was a purer air,
And if your not believed,
At least your not belied,
For none can prove that men have *died*,
Where no man ever lived.

'Tis when the rage is at its height,
That knowing ones will quit the site,
Whilst those that stop behind,
Of this desertion can't complain,
For what they lose in wealth they gain
In knowledge of mankind.

That this poem originated in Alabama and was picked up by an Ohio paper indicates not only the extent of instant city

boosting in both places, but also the similarity of the system throughout the country.

Alabama's new towns, as a group, were better advertised than any other set of would-be cities.³ When the *Philadelphia Union* devoted nearly a page and a half to new towns, fully five out of the fourteen were Alabama paper towns. Four out of the dozen known Alabama towns located in the press achieved urban status (census definition 2500 inhabitants): Florence 34,031; Athens 14,360; Demopolis 7,651 and Marion 4,289.⁴ Only Kentucky can come close to comparing with the territory in the success of its would-be cities.

The Muscle Shoals became a focal point for town promotion. BAINBRIDGE lay "immediately at the foot of the Muscle Shoals, on the South side of the Tennessee River."⁵ Perhaps anticipating the competition of its neighbor, the speculators promoting FLORENCE on the other side of the river spoke of "the usual channel for large boats" being on the northern side, "that towards the southern bank being too shallow." Those backing Florence proclaimed that "Florence lies just below the last of that long series of rapids or shallows, constituting the Muscle Shoals. This, therefore, is, and must be the head of steam-boat navigation." Not content with bragging about Florence's location, the promoters spoke of the town plat — the two main streets were 115 feet wide, other streets 99 feet wide, all lots were corner lots and of almost half an acre each; land had been donated for a college, female seminary, a public walk or pleasure ground, a jail, a court house and a market. Other advantages, real or imagined, included the expectation of an extensive armory and cannon foundery nearby and the passage of the Nashville to New Orleans military road

³Some individual cities were in Indiana and Kentucky, but taken as a whole, Alabama towns were more widely advertised. This may well be because its immigrant flow came from Georgia and Tennessee.

⁴*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* January 26, 1819, trustees J. R. Bedford, James Bright, Michael Byrd, for Marion. The other towns are discussed below.

⁵*Ibid.*, January 12, 1819 and also *Knoxville* (Tennessee) *Register* January 26, 1819, Ro. Weakley, T. Saunders, Jonathan Donelson, Jr., R. P. Currin, Charles Boyles, L. J. Gist, B. Reese, proprietors.

through town.⁶ The advertising blitz paid off as 284 lots brought \$226,000.⁷

Florence's most serious rival was HAVANNAH. This paper town was advertised not only in the *Huntsville Alabama Republican* but also in the *Nashville Clarion*, *Lexington Reporter*, *Louisville Western Courier* and *Pittsburgh Gazette*. "Of all of the sites for towns," wrote the not disinterested trustees, ". . . the town of Havannah has incomparably the highest claim to precedence in a commercial point of view." The town, like Florence, was located on the north side of the Tennessee River and nine miles from its more successful rival.⁸ Not too far away was COURTLAND, a paper town that aspired no higher than to become a county seat.⁹

If one analyzes advertisements for new towns in Alabama, two things became apparent: certain individuals were involved in more than a single speculation and the press of Tennessee and Georgia was depended upon as outlets in which to advertise the would-be cities. ALABAMA, located "only ten miles by land to the junction of the Coosa and Talapoosa," had eleven proprietors. Four gave Milledgeville, Georgia as their address, four Nashville, and three Madison County, Mississippi Territory. Both the geographical spread of the proprietors and the fact that two of them, namely James Jackson and Thomas Bibb,

⁶*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* May 19, 1818, *Lexington, Kentucky Reporter* June 3, 1818; *Louisville* (Kentucky) *Public Advertiser* July 21, 1818, all contained Florence information. Trustees listed as Leroy Pope, Thomas Bibb, John Coffee, James Jackson, J. Childress, Dabney Morriss, J. McKinley.

⁷*Canton Ohio Repository* September 18, 1818, quoting the *Washington, D. C. National Intelligencer*; John Bach McMaster *A History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War* (New York, 1883-1913) IV, 396.

⁸*Lexington, Kentucky Reporter* July 22, 1818, *Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* July 28, 1818, *Pittsburgh* (Pennsylvania) *Gazette* August 7, 1818, and scheduled to be advertised in the *Huntsville Alabama Republican*, *Louisville, Kentucky Western Courier*. E. J. Bailey, George Coulter, Hugh Campbell, Samuel Ragsdale, Joseph Farmer, trustees.

⁹*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* October 6, 1818. William H. Whitaker, James W. Camp, John M. Tilford, Joseph Farmer (name also listed for Havannah), Benjamin Thomas, William F. Broadax, Bernard M. Kiernan, trustees.

were later associated with promoting Florence are instructive.¹⁰ The same strong ties to Tennessee and Georgia can be seen in the choices J. S. Walker made in selecting newspapers in which to advertise his COOSAWDA.¹¹ The promoters of both the towns of Alabama and Coosawda believed that a city would grow up not far from the junction of the Coosa and Talapoosa.

The name of James Jackson appears in association with COTTON-PORT and ATHENS as well as ALABAMA and FLORENCE. Cotton Port, not to be confused with Cotton Gin Port at the head of navigation on the Tombigbee, was located "on the west bank of Limestone river, one mile above its junction with the Tennessee." Of its four trustees, two were associated with Florence as well. James Jackson and Jonathan Coffee.¹² ATHENS, though not having a Florence man for commissioner, was indirectly associated with James Jackson. The advertisement in the *Clarion* announced that the plan "may be seen at the counting room of James Jackson & Company, Nashville."¹³ In as much as much of Alabama was settled by Georgians and Tennesseans, it should not be that surprising that individuals and newspapers from those states should play such a prominent role in advertising Alabama's paper towns. DEMOPOLIS is a case in point being advertised in the *Knoxville Register*, *Nashville Gazette*, *Murfreesborough Courier*, *Milledgeville Georgia Journal* as well as the *Tuskaloosa Republican*, *Huntsville Alabama Republican* and *Mobile Gazette*.¹⁴

The established port of Mobile was challenged by BLAKELY. Though the booster press was quite uncommon in this first round of town promotion, Mobile's rival published the *Blakely Sun*. Its 1818 boast that whereas "one year ago, there

¹⁰*Ibid.*, September 2, 1817. Milledgeville proprietors John Scott, Z. Lamar, Charles Williamson, William D. Stone; Nashville proprietors A. P. Hayne, Jonathan Donelson (see also Bainbridge listing), William E. Butler, James Jackson (see also Florence and Cotton Port proprietors); Madison County, Mississippi Territory proprietors James Manning, Thomas Bibb (see also Florence), Waddy Tate.

¹¹*Knoxville (Tennessee) Register* July 20, 1819, to be advertised in the *Nashville (Tennessee) Whig*, *Augusta (Georgia) Journal*, *Milledgeville Georgia Journal*.

¹²*Philadelphia The Union* August 8, 1818. Trustees Jonathan Coffee, James Jackson, John Bahan, James Bright.

¹³*Nashville (Tennessee) Clarion* April 28, 1818. Robert Beaty and John D. Carriel, Commissioners.

¹⁴*Knoxville (Tennessee) Register* August 24, 1818.

was but one house," now there are one hundred was reprinted as far away as Ohio.¹⁵ Another ambitious promotion was that of Cahawba or CAHABA as it was spelled in the Eastern press. According to its backers, Cahawba "will, probably be the seat of government for the state of Alabama." This dream was fulfilled until 1825 when Tuscaloosa captured the prize.¹⁶ Not all newly promoted towns aspired to grandeur. CANTON and COURTLAND were relatively unambitious. The proprietors of the latter were "convinced that the seat of justice for the county of Lawrence, will unquestionably be located at Courtland."¹⁷ The trustees were overly optimistic as another town received the honor. Courtland, despite the fact that a railroad later ran through it, never achieved urban status, clinging on for life with a population of less than a thousand.

Neither in John W. Rep's *The Making of Urban America: A History of City Planning in the United States* nor in his companion volume *Town Planning in Frontier America* is there a treatment of Alabama's new towns. Likewise though Thomas Perkins Abernethy's *The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828* contains a section entitled "The Immigrants," and his *The South in the New Nations 1789-1819* also covers the 1815-1819 period, neither volume covers in any detail, Alabama's new towns. The number and relative success of new towns within the territory indicates that at least in the case of Alabama, the South had greater urban aspirations than historians have heretofore credited the section. The immigrants and the speculators envisioned a state with towns and cities as well as farms and plantations.

¹⁵Dayton *Ohio Watchman* December 10, 1818. See also McMaster, *History of the People* IV, 395-396.

¹⁶Philadelphia *The Union* August 8, 1818; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, *The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828* (University, Alabama, 1965), 53, 55, 137.

¹⁷For Canton, East of the Alabama River see *Knoxville (Tennessee) Register* February 9, 1819. For Courtland see *Nashville (Tennessee) Clarion* October 6, 1818. William H. Whitaker, James W. Camp, John M. Tilford, Joseph Farmer, Benjamin Thomas, William F. Broadax, Bernard M. Kiernan, trustees.

JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL AND THE HAMPTON'S ROADS CONFERENCE QUIXOTIC DIPLOMACY, 1865

by

Paul J. Zingg

By February, 1865, Confederate hopes for victory had all but vanished. Although the spring campaigns had not yet commenced, Grant's near-encirclement of Petersburg and Sherman's march into the Carolinas portended the inevitable collapse of Southern resistance. Yet for three rebels, the times warranted not the further prosecution of war but the final search for a negotiated peace. Commissioned by executive order of Jefferson Davis, Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John Archibald Campbell journeyed to Hampton Roads, Virginia, to undertake an informal interview with official representatives of the United States government upon "the issues involved in the war existing, with a view of securing peace to the two countries."¹

On board the Union steamer *River Queen* anchored off Old Point Comfort, Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward awaited the Southern commissioners. Neither party was unfamiliar with the subtleties of inter-sectional diplomacy. Although the conference at Hampton Roads would prove to be an important and dramatic encounter between pacific-minded representatives from the North and South, it was hardly the first such meeting. The abortive Crawford-Forsythe-Roman mission in March and April of 1861 had discouraged formal Southern contacts with the Union until the last full year of the war.² Yet, individuals on both sides

¹Instructions of Jefferson Davis to the Peace Commissioners (January, 1865), in John Archibald Campbell, *Reminiscences and Documents Relating to the Civil War During the Year 1865* (Baltimore: John Murray and Co., 1887), 4.

²The mission of Martin J. Crawford of Georgia, John Forsythe of Alabama and A. S. Roman of Louisiana represented the first official diplomatic act of the Confederacy. The Commissioners arrived in Washington on March 5, the day after the inauguration of Lincoln, and petitioned both the President and Secretary Seward for interviews. Their demands for immediate recognition of the Confederate States went unheeded. Although they exchanged notes with Seward, the Southerners were never accorded a formal interview. The ministers returned to the South soon after the outbreak of hostilities at Fort Sumter.

³Greeley to Lincoln, July 7, 1864, in Edward C. Kirkland, *The Peacemakers of 1864* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 76.

of the Mason-Dixon line undertook numerous private peace missions, watched closely by authorities in Washington and Richmond.

Responsibility for the particular initiative which led directly to Hampton Roads lay with several sources. Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, particularly urged Lincoln to grasp any opportunities for peace. "Our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country longs for peace," he wrote the President in the summer, 1864.⁴ Greeley soon obtained a special presidential commission to convey a declaration of Washington's conditions for peace to a wholly unaccredited delegation of Southerners in Niagara, Canada. Although the Niagara Conference of July, 1864, dissolved almost before it began, it did serve as the vehicle by which Lincoln formally announced his requisites for peace and his personal willingness to meet and discuss the terms "with any authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States."⁴ Although private peace efforts continued, the presidential offer went virtually unheeded until January, 1865.⁵

John Archibald Campbell claimed that his correspondence with the Supreme Court Justice Samuel Nelson in December,

⁴Lincoln to "To Whom It May Concern," July 18, 1864, in Roy P. Basler, Ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), VII, 451. Lincoln's terms included ". . . the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery." The President's public letter is particularly noteworthy because he formally announced that Southern acceptance of the Federal emancipation program was a requisite for peace.

⁵Among the more notable of the private peace inquiries which continued during the latter days of the war were: the informal negotiations of James F. Jacquess and James R. Gilmore with Jefferson Davis, July, 1864; the Peoria and Springfield conventions, August, 1864; the unofficial discussions between United States Ambassador to Great Britain Charles Francis Adams and Tennessean Thomas Yeatman early 1864; and the Toronto meetings between Jeremiah S. Black and Jacob Thompson, August, 1864. For details, see: Harriet Chappel Owsley, "Peace and the Presidential Election of 1864," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (March, 1959), 3-19; Clament A. Evans, *Confederate Military History* (Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Co., 1899), I, 477-459; Harlan H. Horner, *Lincoln and Greeley* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953); Horace Greeley, *The American Conflict* (Hartford: D. D. Cass and Co., 1886), II; and Kirkland, *The Peacemakers of 1864*. Brief sketches of these events can be found conveniently in J. G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, Second Edition (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1969).

1864, led directly to the Hampton Roads conference. In mid-December Campbell inquired "whether anything could be effected for the amelioration of the conditions which it [the war] has occasioned."⁶ Campbell admitted that his inquiry was completely unofficial; his objective was "simply to promote an interchange of views and opinions which might be productive of good, and scarcely do harm."⁷ Nelson forwarded the letter to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, "who expressed satisfaction with it," but sent no reply to Campbell.⁸

The private activities of Greely, Campbell, and others certainly demonstrated a genuine, non-partisan drive for peace. The example of such efforts and the subtle pressures for peace which they brought to bear on Lincoln moved the President to express publicly his receptivity to legitimate Southern overtures.

Perhaps in the final analysis, though, the peace conference that convened at Hampton Roads was due less to individual initiative than to general public demand. The imminent collapse of the Confederacy and the overall national exhaustion relative to the war effort by December, 1864-January, 1865, doubtless placed peace negotiations in a more favorable light as a viable alternative to the war's continuation. Though conditions prevailed which by themselves were most conducive to serious peace efforts, enterprising individuals both North and South provided the final energy which placed the peace forces on the road to the Virginia conference.

In late December, 1864, Francis P. Blair, Sr., a Maryland gentleman and the father of a Brigadier General under Sherman's command, received a *carte blanche* pass from Lincoln "to . . . go South, and return."⁹ Although Lincoln denied Blair's right "to speak for the United States government," it is inconceivable that the President was wholly unaware — as he later affirmed — of the purpose and destination of Blair's

⁶Campbell to Nelson, December, 1864, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XVI (January, 1865), 7-8. Campbell sent a copy of this letter to George Munford, Secretary of the Society.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Campbell to Justice Benjamin Curtis, July 20, 1865, in *Century Magazine*, XXXVIII, New Series XVI (October, 1889), 950-954.

⁹Lincoln to Blair, December 28, 1864, in Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 188.

trip.¹⁰ Blair traveled to Richmond where he immediately secured an interview with Jefferson Davis.

In a private conference with the Southern Chief Executive, Blair outlined a wholly incredible proposal for peace. Essentially Blair suggested that a "secret military convention" be formed between the North and the South in order to prevent the establishment of the projected French empire in Mexico and to maintain the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The proposed alliance would temporarily suspend hostilities between the Union and the Confederacy. With attentions diverted to the elimination of the mutual French threat, statesmen might negotiate the outstanding sectional problems and extend the temporary truce into a permanent peace.¹¹

As preposterous as Blair's proposal may have seemed, it had a familiar ring. In early spring, 1861, while searching for an alternative to prevent war, Seward had proposed essentially the same plan to Lincoln.¹² The possibility of a connection between the two plans, remote though it may be, raises some intriguing questions. Did the Seward plan — a plan generally dismissed as momentary, though inexplicable, fantasy of the Secretary of State — receive serious consideration? If Blair did speak for the Administration, an impression which he certainly conveyed to Davis, did he reveal some innate expansionary tendencies of the Lincoln government? And finally, did Lincoln's attendance at Hampton Roads and Seward's evident interest in the plan during the conference indicate an endorsement of the plan?

¹⁰Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, in United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, XLVI, I, 506.

¹¹The Confederate representatives at Hampton Roads have included discussions of the Blair proposal in their accounts of the conference. These include: Campbell, *Reminiscences*; Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States* (Philadelphia: National Publishing Co., 1870), II, 589-622; Hunter, "The Peace Commission of 1865," *SHSP*, III, (April, 1877), 168-176.

¹²Seward proposed that the United States government demand explanations from France, Great Britain, Russia, and Spain concerning their intentions in the Western Hemisphere. The memorandum, appropriately enough introduced to the Lincoln cabinet on April Fool's Day, sought a congressional declaration of war if satisfactory explanations were not forthcoming.

¹³Campbell to Curtis (July 20, 1865), in *Century Magazine*, 952.

The available evidence seems to refute any formal Federal ratification of the Mexico invasion scheme. During the conference Lincoln clearly disassociated his government from any of the Blair proposals; and Campbell noted that within five minutes after the meeting began the Confederates learned that Blair's revelations to Davis "were a delusion." The significance of the Blair plan lies in its pitiful attractiveness to the South — the same attractiveness, Fitzhugh Lee analogized, as that of "a straw that a drowning man is always authorized to seize."¹⁴

The Blair-Davis interview concluded with the Confederate President's assurances of his willingness "to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace . . . to the two countries."¹⁵ Blair departed Richmond and met with Lincoln in Washington on January 18. The President reiterated his readiness "to receive any agent whom he [Davis], or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country."¹⁶ It is, of course, obvious that Davis' "two countries" and Lincoln's "one common country" are the same entity. The Confederate contention of full independence and the Union refusal to recognize that status created diplomatic problems which extended beyond mere semantics. Nevertheless, Blair felt compelled to explain to Davis the identity between his and Lincoln's terms.¹⁷

Lincoln permitted Blair to return to Richmond where he informed Davis of the President's position. Davis acted quickly. He arranged a meeting with Stephens, met his cabinet the following day, and, on January 28, dispatched Stephens, Hunter and Campbell to Hampton Roads.

¹⁴Fitzhugh Lee, "The Failure of the Hampton Conference," *Century Magazine*, LII, New Series XXX (July, 1896), 478.

¹⁵Davis to Blair, January 12, 1865, in Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, I, 507.

¹⁶Lincoln to Blair, January 18, 1865, *Ibid.*, 508. The letters of Lincoln and Davis to Blair established the basis upon which the conference rested.

¹⁷Lincoln noted the results of Blair's second conversation with Davis on the back of a copy of the letter which Lincoln had given Blair on January 18. The entry, dated January 28, recorded that Davis understood Blair's explanation concerning the "two countries" and "one common country." See: Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, in *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, I, 508; Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 276.

The appointments of Stephens and Hunter to the commission were understandable. Vice-President Stephens, despite his well-known animosity towards Davis, held the second highest post in the Confederate government. Nominal leader of the Southern moderates, he opposed secession before the war and encouraged peace missions during it. Neither Davis nor the commissioners expected initially that Lincoln himself would represent the North at Hampton Roads. Stephens' attendance at the conference, however, helped alleviate tensions between the two delegations. He and Lincoln reminisced about associations and incidents for former days and established a tone of cordiality which would extend during the entire four-hour meeting.¹⁸ Notwithstanding the Vice-President's rapport with Lincoln, his presence on the commission demonstrated the apparently late-blooming disposition of Davis to peace efforts and considerable diplomatic sense.¹⁶

R. M. T. Hunter owed his appointment to prior experience in both the United States and Confederate governments. As a former United States Congressman, Speaker of the House, and Senator, he commanded respect from his former Union colleagues. As interim Secretary of State for the Confederacy, July, 1861-March, 1862, he acquired valuable diplomatic experience. His position in the winter of 1865 — Senator and President *pro tempore* of the Confederate upper house — required his presence in Richmond.²⁰ Yet, Davis rejected the advice of Vice-President Stephens to appoint individuals "whose absence from the city would not attract public attention," and dispatched the versatile Hunter to Hampton Roads.²¹

¹⁸See the full accounts of the meeting in: Campbell, *Reminiscences*; Stephens, *A Constitutional View*; and Hunter, "The Peace Commission of 1865," SHSP.

¹⁹Works on Stephens include: Rudolph von Abele, *Alexander H. Stephens: A Biography* (New York: 1946); E. Ramsey Richardson, *Little Aleck: A Life of Alexander H. Stephens, The Fighting Vice-President of the Confederacy* (New York: 1932); and two relevant articles by James Z. Rabun, "Alexander H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis," *American Historical Review*, LVIII (1953), 290-321, and "Alexander H. Stephens and the Confederacy," *Emory University Quarterly*, VI (1950), 129-146.

²⁰The only notable biography on Hunter is Henry H. Simms, *The Life of Robert M. T. Hunter: A Study in Sectionalism and Secession* (Richmond: 1935).

²¹Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 593. In all fairness, though, to the prospective Confederate peace delegates, Stephens also noted that they should be "men of ability and discretion." The Southern Vice-President's own choices were Campbell, General Henry L. Benning, ex-Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and Thomas S. Flournoy of Virginia, "a gentleman of distinguished ability and well-known personally to Mr. Lincoln."

The qualifications of the third member of the Southern peace delegation, John Archibald Campbell though more difficult to define, were hardly less impressive than those of his compatriots. Certainly they extended beyond Stephens' simple criteria that the Confederate commissioners be persons whose absence would not be missed in Richmond.

A native Georgian, Campbell had moved to Montgomery, Alabama in 1830. Admitted to the Georgia bar at age 18 by a special act of the state legislature, Campbell continued to practice law in Alabama. There he acquired considerable respect within the legal community and enjoyed a successful practice, particularly after his move to Mobile in 1837.²² Twice elected to the Alabama state legislature, Campbell represented his adopted state at the Nashville Convention of 1850.²³ In 1853 President Franklin Pierce appointed conservative Democrat Campbell to the United States Supreme Court. Though moderately opposed to secession, Campbell waived his position on the Court and resigned from the bench in April, 1861. Branded as a traitor by the North and as a Unionist by the South, he fled to New Orleans where he resumed his private law career.²⁴ Recalled to public service by the Confederacy, Campbell served as Assistant Secretary of War from October, 1862, until the end of the war.²⁵

²²Campbell was twice offered a seat on the Alabama Supreme Court. He declined both times in order to attend to his lucrative private law practice.

²³Nine slave states attended the June, 1850, convention in Nashville, Tennessee, to discuss the Compromise of 1850 and the larger issue of Southern rights. The convention adopted a resolution which called for an extension of the 1820 Missouri Compromise line westward to the Pacific. Campbell followed a pro-Southern line in contending that Congress did not have the right to define property in a state, but that Congress was bound to honor the definition as established by the individual states.

²⁴The move was more than professionally expedient as Campbell had been threatened with a lynching upon his return to Mobile.

²⁵There is no satisfactory study on any aspect of Campbell's judicial, political or diplomatic careers. A biography by Henry G. Connor, *John Archibald Campbell* (Boston: 1920), is sadly outdated, quaint in nature, and wholly inadequate. Related articles include: James P. McPherson, "The Career of John Archibald Campbell: A Study in Politics and the Law," *Alabama Review*, XIX (January, 1966), 53-63; E. I. McCormac, "Justice Campbell and the Dred Scott Decision," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XIX, 4 (March, 1933), 565-571; Thad Holt, Jr., "The Resignation of Mr. Justice Campbell," *Alabama Review*, XII (January, 1959), 105-118; Richard H. Leach, "John Archibald Campbell and the Alston Letter," *Alabama Review*, XI (January, 1958), 64-75.

It was not only Campbell's public record which brought him the Hampton Roads commission in early 1865. As Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Campbell had served as the unofficial intermediary between the Confederate commissioners Crawford, Forsythe and Roman and Secretary of State Seward during the secession and Fort Sumter crises of March-April, 1861. This mild familiarity with intersectional diplomacy, in addition to his moderate political philosophy and tacit encouragement of peace efforts during the war, made Campbell an attractive negotiator to the North and a sound representative from the South.

The wisdom of Davis, however, in selecting the three commissioners is suspect. Despite their notable political records and obligingly moderate views towards a settlement with the North the peace delegates shared a more particular chord in their relationship with the Confederate President — his enmity. Stephens and Hunter were conspicuous members of the anti-Davis group within the Confederate government. The Vice-President's criticisms were often so vocal and barbed that they partially explain the failure of the two men to meet in private conference at the Richmond capitol until January, 1865. Campbell, who claimed that the main reason he had accepted a position in the Confederate government was in anticipation of becoming "useful in the settlement of a peace,"²⁶ severely censured Davis for his recalcitrant attitude towards peace negotiations. The judge labeled the Southern President as "slow, procrastinating, obstructive, and filled with petty scruples and doubts," and he charged that the "idiosyncrasy" of Davis alone had "defeated the designs" to seek peace.²⁷ Subject to such adverse criticism, Davis conceivably could have dispatched this trio of personal political adversaries to Hampton Roads in anticipation that, with the failure of the conference, the commissioners along with illusions of rapprochement with the Union would fall into public discredit.

After the Southerners had departed Richmond for the conference, they were detained momentarily at City Point, Virginia. A discrepancy between their instructions and Lincoln's directions to his aide, who was sent to escort the com-

²⁶Campbell to Curtis, July 20, 1865, *Century Magazine*, 951.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 953.

missioners, on the issue of the meeting place caused the delay.²⁸ However, General Ulysses S. Grant hastened to assure Lincoln of his belief in the good intentions of the Confederates. Grant and the commissioners had impressed each other favorably during two interviews in the general's quarters.²⁹ Grant thus expressed concern that the Confederates' "going back without any expression from anyone in authority will have a bad influence."³⁰ The general also indicated his disappointment that Lincoln had not intended himself to meet the Southern delegation. Moved by Grant's telegram, Lincoln resolved to join Seward at Hampton Roads. "Say to the gentlemen," Lincoln wired Grant, "I will meet them personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there."³¹ The president arrived at Hampton Roads in the evening of February 2. On the morning of the 3rd, the Confederates boarded the *River Queen*.

The conference took place in the grand saloon of the Federal steamer. After the perfunctory exchange of courtesies and introductions, they mutually agreed to ground rules for the meeting. The negotiations would be entirely informal; only the five conferees would be present; and, no written records would be kept. The matter of the Mexican invasion plan, though introduced and enumerated by Stephens at the curious urging of Seward, was promptly dismissed when Lincoln firmly disavowed any knowledge or sanction of the scheme. The President dismissed the role of Francis P. Blair as an "old man"

²⁸The Confederates had been instructed "to proceed to Washington City to hold a conference with President Lincoln." Lincoln instructed Major Thomas Eckert to conduct the commissioners to Fort Monroe at Hampton Roads. He added: "If by their answer they decline to come, or propose other terms, do not have them passed through." Faced with two apparently irrevocable and contradictory directions, the Southerners hesitated. Lincoln had decided to cancel the conference when he received the Grant telegram, and, shortly after, assurances from Eckert that the Confederates had acquiesced to the President's terms. See: Stephens, Hunter, Campbell to Grant January 30, 1865; Lincoln to Eckert, January 30, 1865; Eckert to Lincoln, February 2, 1865, in Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XI.VI, I, 508-512; Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 278-282.

²⁹See: Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 597-599; Grant to Stanton, February 1 and 2, 1865, *Ibid.*; Seward to Charles Francis Adams, February 7, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 472.

³⁰Grant to Stanton, February 1, 1865, *Ibid.*

³¹Lincoln to Grant, February 2, 1865; Lincoln to Seward, February 2, 1865, *Ibid.*, 511; Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 256.

who had meant well, but who had operated without any previous commission to make such propositions. Stephens noted the short uneasy silence which followed Lincoln's words.³² Campbell later recalled that it was at this moment that he and the other commissioners finally realized that they had been "duped" by Blair.³³

Campbell then inquired as to the manner in which the restoration of the Union might be made if the Confederate States were consenting. Lincoln replied that the disbandment of forces hostile to the government of the United States and the restoration of Federal authority throughout the nation were primary requisites for reunion. The Confederates pressed for details. How would disbandment occur? How could settlements arising out of the various confiscation acts be reached? And, most pressing, what would be the status of the slave population in the Southern states? Seward dismissed most questions pertaining to the details of reunion and referred the Confederates to the President's annual message to Congress in December, 1864, in which Lincoln outlined many of the specifics for reconstruction.³⁴ The slavery question, though, received considerable attention.³⁵

"His head bent down, as if in deep reflection," Stephens recalled, the President entered into a lengthy discussion on the slavery situation.³⁶ Lincoln initially explained that the Emancipation Proclamation was a "war measure" and that its application during reconstruction was strictly for the courts to decide. Reference to the proposed constitutional amendment for the immediate abolition of slavery throughout the United States, Lincoln emphasized that, if adopted by the states, it would be his responsibility to enforce its provisions. Both parties agreed "that agitation upon the subject of the political relations between the races" would not cease with legislative emancipation. Lincoln re-emphasized, though, "that the complete restoration of the national authority everywhere was an indispensable condition" for peace.³⁷

³²Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 601.

³³Campbell to Curtis, July 20, 1865, *Century Magazine*, 953.

³⁴Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1864, in Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 136-152.

³⁵Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 610-618; Campbell, "Memorandum of the Conversation at the Conference in Hampton Roads," in *Reminiscences*, 12-16.

³⁶Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 614.

³⁷Seward to Adams, February 7, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 471.

The accounts by Campbell and Stephens of the President's replies to their inquiries on slavery present Lincoln in a most sympathetic, almost apologetic, light. Both Southern commissioners noted Lincoln's reluctance to expound on the permanency of the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment. Constantly they stressed Lincoln's reference to both acts as purely "war measures" and that "as soon as the war ended, . . . (they) would be inoperative for the future."³⁸ Stephens, in fact, claimed that Lincoln expressed certainty that once the Southern states had been restored to their practical relations to the Union" — a reference to the President's intentions for a speedy and pacific reconstruction — the ex-Confederate states themselves could easily defeat the proposed amendment by voting it down as legitimate members of the Union.³⁹

This account of Lincoln's views on slavery and emancipation must surely please those who see Lincoln as the reluctant emancipator and expedient politician *par excellence*; yet, they must also be considered with some reservation. To portray the Federal anti-slavery measures in terms of political and military necessity lessens the moral issue of slavery and partially redeems the Southern position. Although Lincoln's statements were not seriously altered by the Southern delegates in their reports, they certainly were interpreted and presented in a light most favorable to the Confederate position. Stephens, in particular, writing five years after the event, belatedly sought to moderate the differences between North and South. He described the President as a man pushed by events and bent on conciliation at any cost between the sections. Such a view obviously would lessen the improbitious stigma still assigned to the South by attuning Lincoln's position more to an even understanding of the Confederate argument than to radical condemnation of it.

The conversation at Hampton Roads then took another turn. Hunter, silent until now, asked about the status of West Virginia. Lincoln replied that the question of Virginia's boundaries would have to be settled by other departments of the

³⁸Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 611-612; Campbell, "Memorandum of the Conversation at the Conference in Hampton Roads," *Reminiscences*, 14.

³⁹Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 412.

government. However, he personally felt that West Virginia would continue to be recognized as a separate state in the Union.⁴⁰

Hunter then offered a brief summary of the conference and concluded that a final basis for peace apparently involved the "unconditional submission" of the South. Seward objected to the implied humiliation which the word "submission" carried and engaged Hunter in a mild debate, the most heated exchange during the conference. Hunter repeated his views of the conference and challenged Seward to define the North's position in terms other than that of a conqueror who refused to provide for the future security of the South. The Secretary of State again denied conqueror status for the United States and assured Hunter that all the Union sought was "required obedience to the laws." Seward contended that the guarantees and securities for the personal and political rights of the Southern people and Southern states would be adequately provided under the Constitution. The Hunter-Seward exchange relied on the rhetoric of the pre-Civil War constitutional debate. The issue, however, was pursued no further by any of the delegates; yet, the exchange revealed, if only for a moment, that after four years of fighting there was still no satisfactory solution to the Constitutional argument.

The meeting had progressed for nearly four hours when Stephens noted: ". . . there was a pause, as if all felt that the interview should close."⁴² Hunter and Stephens desperately urged the President to reconsider the subject of an armistice. He promised a reconsideration, but denied the likelihood of any change in attitude. "The two parties then took formal and friendly leave of each other."⁴³ Lincoln and Seward returned to Washington on the same day; the Confederates reached Richmond on February 5.

The conference elicited mixed responses in the North and South. Davis charged "that the enemy refused to enter into

⁴⁰Hunter, "The Peace Commission," 175-178.

⁴¹Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 616-617; Campbell, "Memorandum of the Conversation at the Conference in Hampton Roads," in *Reminiscences*, 15.

⁴²Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 618.

⁴³*Ibid.*

negotiations with the Confederate States."⁴⁴ He criticized the Federal position at Hampton Roads and declared that Lincoln's terms of "unconditional surrender" were wholly unacceptable and unreasonable. On his return to Washington, Lincoln faced a suspicious Congress, which promptly demanded a full report on the interview.⁴⁵ The President's reply to the House included all of the relevant documents he possessed concerning the conference and his assurances that nothing had been said or promised at the meeting which was inconsistent with his previous statements on reunion.⁴⁶

Congressional misgivings were not unwarranted. Although Lincoln's role at Hampton Roads still remains subject to uncertain speculation, some conclusions can be drawn. Just as the Niagara Conference had served as the instrument by which Lincoln formally announced the conditions for peace, Hampton Roads served as the vehicle by which he re-affirmed his terms. He assumed the initiative for reconstruction and grasped an opportunity at the conference to assert his leadership and to indicate his leniency. His disavowal of the Blair plan indicated the unalterable nature of the presidential conditions.

The Hampton Roads conference, though, proved much more than a political stage for Lincoln. Seward aptly remarked that "it is perhaps of some importance that we have been able to submit our opinions to prominent insurgents, and to have them an answer [sic] in a courteous and not unfriendly manner."⁴⁷ The politics of diplomacy precluded a formal exchange of views. Moreover, despite the inevitability of the Southern frustration at Hampton Roads, the meeting clearly revealed a mutual and serious inclination to pacific negotiations. Yet, in demonstrat-

⁴⁴Grant filed a report with Stanton, February 7, 1864 in which he included several articles that had recently appeared in the *Richmond Dispatch*. The *Dispatch* noted in its February 7 edition that Davis had placed two documents before the Confederate Congress. The papers included the commissioners' report to Davis and his own comments on the conference. See: *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 446.

⁴⁵Thaddeus Stevens introduced a House resolution which called for full information on the Hampton Roads conference. On the same day, February 6, Charles Sumner initiated a similar resolution in the Senate. See: Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 286-287.

⁴⁶Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, *Ibid.*, 274-285; *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 1, 505-513.

⁴⁷Seward to Adams, February 7, 1865, *Ibid.*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 473.

ing a purported basic principle in American foreign policy — the peaceful settlement of disputes — the conference revealed the inadequacy of such tenets before the forces of power politics, conflicting ideology, and aggressive militarism.

THE FOURTH ALABAMA INFANTRY: FIRST BLOOD

by

Kenneth W. Jones

Once Alabama began considering in the winter of 1860/61 an ordinance of secession, townspeople everywhere turned out to prepare for war. Local bodies of militia were organized and drilled, and the face of Alabama took on a martial aspect within a few weeks. Marion was typical of the black-belt communities in the state, and it was celebrating muster day when the act of secession was announced. Two companies of cavalry and two of infantry were drawn up in the streets, and when the news was read, "three loud and hearty cheers went up from each company on parade." A short while after, one infantry company, the Marion Rifles, was escorted to the railroad depot by very nearly the entire population of the town and surrounding county.¹ Also present were the young ladies of the town. They accompanied the Rifles, "very reluctantly bid them *adieu*, wondering in our minds whether or not would they ever return."²

The Marion Rifles proceeded to Fort Morgan, near Mobile, to join other groups from Greensboro and Tuscaloosa. The small garrison drilled and stood guard, and they built up defenses around Mobile Bay with sandbags. In the latter part of February, they returned to Marion in good spirits.³

After spending several days at home visiting friends and relatives, the Rifles were re-organized for service in Virginia where war threatened to explode. Again, the preparations for sending off the company were elaborate. A reception was arranged where the festivities were prolonged far into the night. The following day, a flag was presented to the Rifles and its Captain, Porter King. The blue silken banner had been fashioned from the wedding gown of a bride of less than three months, and it was the work of several of the area's young

¹Undated news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I, Bowling Library, Judson College, Marion, Alabama.

²Mattie M. Smith to Gussie, February 10, 1861, Smith Papers.

³"Fort Morgan Correspondence," news clipping, January 17, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

ladies. Captain King thanked the townsfolk using his oratorical flare, and the Rifles left town once more, travelling via steamer to Montgomery and via rail to Dalton, Georgia.⁴

The departure of the Rifles was a scene repeated all over Alabama and the South in the spring and summer of 1861. It was duplicated in Selma, Huntsville, Larkinsville, Uniontown, Evergreen, Tuskegee, and Florence, as companies from each of these places gathered at Dalton to be mustered into Confederate service. On May 2, those units were organized as the Fourth Alabama Infantry Regiment. Elections were held the following day, and a Huntsville lawyer named Egbert Jones became colonel, while Evander McIver Law and Charles L. Scott were elected lieutenant-colonel and major, respectively.⁵

The new regiment was armed with what weapons were available and on May 4 was ordered to Virginia, "buoyant with hope and eager for fame."⁶ At least one of the volunteers protested at the indignity of being moved by a train of box cars and simply refused to go. He was put on board by main force. "It was the Confederacy's first test of our mettle (and also evidence of its early necessities) and we endured it as something not relished and which we hoped would not happen again. Later in the war we were grateful for a chance to ride in anything."⁷

The Alabamians arrived in Lynchburg, Virginia where on May 7 they took the oath of allegiance to the Confederate States of America as twelve months' troops. They were issued new 69 calibre muskets which they accepted reluctantly and were ordered on to Harper's Ferry. The route was pleasant and scenic and passed through Manassas Junction to the end

⁴"The Rifles Now Have A Flag To March Under," news clipping, July 5, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I; news clipping, *Marion Commonwealth*, April 28, 1861, Fourth Infantry Regiment file, Alabama State Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama.

⁵P. T. Vaughn [private, Company A, Selma Governor's Guards], "Memories of the Civil War," undated news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook III hereafter cited as "Memories"; Mordecai M. Cooke [sergeant, Company G, Marion Rifles], "Reminiscences of the Fourth Alabama," news clipping, *Marion Commonwealth*, August 30, 1866, Fourth Infantry Regiment file.

⁶Cooke, "Reminiscences of the Fourth Alabama," news clipping, *Marion Commonwealth*, September 6, 1866, Fourth Infantry Regiment file.

⁷Vaughn, "Memories."

of track at Strassburg. The troops walked to Winchester. Most of the men had left home with trunks or valises, but these heavy, cumbersome items were quickly left behind. Changes of clothing became scarce thereafter, but the losses were eased by throngs of "rosy-cheeked girls who swarmed along the sidewalks and welcomed us as we marched up the main street" of Winchester.⁸

To Harper's Ferry from Winchester was but a short march, and the Fourth was quickly encamped on "Bolivar Heights" to begin what promised to be an intensive training period. Harper's Ferry was where "that shiftless vagabond," John Brown, had "adopted arson, robbery, and midnight assassinations as an occupation for a livelihood, and steeped his individual hands in the blood of innocent and unsuspecting people." Inciting thoughts such as these assured that the green volunteers took their training most seriously, even though they were impatient and at times bored. They were desperately anxious to fight, but they waited and practised being soldiers.⁹

Occasionally the unseasoned troops imagined injustices at the hands of their regimental commanders. Rumors blamed Colonel Jones for the monotonous inactivity, and some of the troops demanded that he resign his commission. No misconduct was charged against the colonel, but so early in the war there was no social distinction between enlisted men and their officers. Resentment at Jones' superior position must have prompted petitions to circulate through the regiment which called for his stepping down. But the colonel took the matter before his commanding officer, General Joseph E. Johnston, who advised the regiment either to draft substantive complaints or to drop the affair. None was submitted, and when the colonel promised to resign after the first engagement should his regiment desire, the men were satisfied.¹⁰

Prior to summer, 1861, Union and Confederate armies had not come to serious blows. Federal authorities were pressing for combat before their own volunteers' three-month enlistments expired. In response Brigadier General Irvin

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

McDowell prepared to advance against Brigadier General Pierre G. T. Beauregard whose Army of the Potomac was near the vital railroad center, Manassas Junction. Supporting McDowell was Major General Robert Patterson who crossed the Potomac River on July 2, 1861 to demonstrate against General Johnston and prevent the latter's Army of the Shenandoah from linking with Beauregard's at Manassas. The elderly Patterson, however, did not clearly understand his task and simply strengthened his position around Harper's Ferry. Johnston had been expecting battle and had on June 15 evacuated his army to Winchester. He left J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry behind to screen his subsequent movements.

Beauregard had positioned his army along Bull Run Creek, a front eight miles long which stretched from Union Mill's Ford to the north and west to the Stone Bridge. The creek itself was a small watercourse which ran east into the Potomac between Manassas and Centreville, falling between steep embankments bordered by thick forests and broken terrain. High ground commanded the northern side and provided a slight advantage there. Roads fanned out in several directions and there were many well-used fords.¹¹

Southerners, too, were anxious to fight a grand battle in order to end the war. Beauregard was defending Manassas but wanted to initiate an attack against Washington. His desire colored his planning, and most of his troops were stationed on the Confederate right flank. And it was General McDowell who captured the advantage by beginning the first slow moves toward Centreville and Manassas.

Union officers knew they outnumbered the Confederates and had no particular reason to believe their crossing of Bull Run Creek would be contested. Federal forces on the morning of July 18, 1861 were approaching the creek at Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords when they stumbled into rebel defensive works. The Southerners fell back behind the creek, and the Yankees opened an artillery barrage. Since Union gunners fired from high ground, they were able to use their superior

¹¹Pierre G. T. Beauregard, "Official Report of the Battle of Bull Run, fought July 18, 1861," news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I; *Campaigns of the Civil War*, I (New York, 1963), 176.

weaponry with effect. Nonetheless, the defense held off all advances and fired at cannon flashes with such accuracy as to create a "baffled, flying foe" who fled the field amidst great confusion, littering the ground with abandoned equipment. General Beauregard had nothing but praise for his own men.


As a part of the history of this engagement, I desire to place on record that on the 18th day of July not one yard of entrenchments nor one rifle pit sheltered the men at Blackburn's ford, who, officers and men, with rare exceptions, were on that day for the first time under fire, and who, taking and maintaining every position ordered, cannot be too much commended for their soldierly behavior.¹²

Confederate casualties were light while Northern losses could only be imagined, but several corpses were found, prisoners were taken, and a variety of arms and equipment was salvaged. Beauregard was confident of further gains, and he suggested that Bull Run demonstrated that the North would not prevail against determined Southern troops.¹³ McDowell, however, decided that if a frontal assault had not worked, he would attempt to turn the Confederate left flank by marching on Beauregard from the vicinity of Sudley Springs.

General Joseph E. Johnston had been informed by wire of McDowell's attack and had ordered his army that afternoon to begin the twenty-mile march toward the railroad for Manassas. The Fourth Alabama decamped at Winchester and traveled all day and most of the night in order to cross the Shenandoah River and Blue Ridge Mountains. The Alabamians arrived in Piedmont after nightfall on July 19. Other troops, for lack of adequate rail facilities, waited there for two days without rations. But the Fourth, in company with General Johnston himself, boarded a train shortly after midnight with the Second Mississippi and two companies of the Eleventh Mississippi, all part of General Barnard E. Bee's Third Bri-

¹²Beauregard, "Official Report."

¹³*Ibid.*



gade.¹⁴ The brigade was taken to Manassas where they pulled in at noon, July 20, the last Confederate unit to reach the field before the upcoming engagement. That their passage had been rapid was indicated by the regimental tents left behind in Winchester and scanty food supplies carried along the way.¹⁵

Bee's Third Brigade along with those of Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson and Colonel Francis Bartow were soon positioned about two miles from Manassas, along "the edge of the pine thicket, in rear of and equidistant from McLean's and Blackburn's Fords, ready to support either position."¹⁶ Here at Camp Walker the Alabama regiment spent the balance of the day and that night resting in a humid forest, eating whatever food was available. After their long journey, the regiment was fatigued and hungry, "much jaded by the exposure."¹⁷

Once at Manassas, General Johnston outranked Beauregard and assumed overall charge of the combined armies. Johnston agreed to Beauregard's planned operations, however, so that the latter remained the effective tactical commander of the Confederate army.

Sunday morning, July 21, 1861, promised to be hot. The Manassas Gap Railroad had been unable to move Johnston's

¹⁴General Johnston had organized his army into four brigades on July 30, 1861. Bee's Third Brigade was composed of the 4th Alabama, the 2nd and 11th Mississippi, the 6th North Carolina, and, temporarily, the 1st Tennessee. Also attached to the brigade was John Imboden's artillery battery (Robert T. Coles [sergeant-major, 4th Alabama], "History of Fourth Regiment, Alabama Volunteer Infantry, C. S. A., Army of Northern Virginia," [unpublished typescript, 1909], 13, Fourth Infantry Regiment files).

¹⁵W. C. Ward [private, Company G, Marion Rifles], "The Fourth Alabama at the Battle of Manassas: Part of the Regiment took action in the greatest battle ever fought in America up to that time," undated news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook III.

¹⁶Pierre G. T. Beauregard, "Report of General Beauregard of the Battle of Manassas," in *Southern History of the War. Official Reports of Battles, as published by order of the Confederate Congress at Richmond* (New York, 1863), 6-7.

¹⁷Thomas J. Goldsby [captain, Company A, Selma Governor's Guards], "4th Alabama Regiment—Official Report," news clipping, [Richmond *Dispatch*], July 29, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I; and Edward P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (New York, 1907), 18-27.

entire army away from Piedmont, and the enemy was rumored to count at least 55,000 troops.¹⁸ Nevertheless, General Beauregard alerted his commanders to be prepared for an assault against the Yankees around Centreville.

Shortly after dawn, Captain Nathan G. Evans in front of the Stone Bridge on the extreme Confederate left, was confronted by Federals who advanced and opened fire with artillery. By 6 a.m., the barrage was expanded against the whole left wing. Evans was ordered to hold his place until Beauregard could launch a "rapid, determined attack, with my right wing and centre on the enemy's left flank and rear."¹⁹

Bee's brigade had breakfasted early that Sunday while speculating on the meaning of the explosions heard from the northeast. At the Stone Bridge, Evans was convinced that the demonstration against him was a feint; the Yankees were not pressing their advance. To be secure, Beauregard at 7 a.m. sent word to Bee to move as many of his and Bartlow's troops to support Evans as had been at camp, approximately 2700 men. The brigades, with the Fourth Alabama in the lead, fell in with knapsacks and arms, and Bee hurried them toward the Stone Bridge, where the enemy had first appeared. The pace was double-quick, and the day was already very hot. Little water was to be had, and the reinforcements were weary and thirsty when they moved into line on the Henry House Hill, a broad plateau south of the Warrenton Turnpike. Many of the men had suffered earlier attacks of measles and were too weak to continue the forced march.²⁰

Capt. Edward P. Alexander, from a hilltop vantage point in the Confederate rear, observed at 8:45 a.m. sunlight flashing in the distance. Peering intently, he spotted a large Federal column in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. He sent a wig-wag message to Evans, "Look out for your left; you are turned."²¹ His suspicions confirmed, Evans shifted most of

¹⁸McDowell had less than 28,000 men after he reached Centreville (*Campaigns*, I, 174). If Patterson had come from Harper's Ferry, he would have provided another 18,000 men at most (Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I [New York, 1942], 43).

¹⁹Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 5-6.

²⁰Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" Goldsby, "Official Report;" Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 56.

²¹Alexander, *Memoirs*, 30.

his 1100 men from the bridge toward the left to defend the Manassas-Sudley Springs Road. Shortly after 9:15 a.m., leading Federal skirmishers were exchanging rifle shots with the Confederates.

Union columns on the Sudley Springs Road were poorly organized and haltingly slow. Leading elements had to wait for the rear-most companies to reach the front and complete a battle line, and it was not until 10 a.m. that the Northerners moved out of the woods onto the open fields. The inability of the Yankees to organize a unified assault allowed Evans' small force to hold them up until additional troops could strengthen the thin Confederate defense.

General Beauregard's actions during most of the early morning were pre-determined by his intention to attack with his own right flank, and he spent at least a full hour after the first shots were sounded in doing nothing. He was informed at mid-morning that his advance had miscarried and that several hours would be needed to reorganize. Under the circumstances, the general simply decided to hold his right. He dispatched orders to re-inforce Evans, who by that time was experiencing severe strain in countering the Union advance.²²

Once General Bee's Third Brigade mounted the high Henry House Hill, they found Evans confronted by growing enemy numbers. Bee responded by moving his whole force across the valley of Young's Branch somewhat before 11 a.m. Under heavy fire, Bee placed his brigade along Evans' line but a little in front and to the right. He sent Bartow's Georgia regiments to a woods of second-growth pines on the extreme right. The Fourth Alabama checked and loaded their weapons, marched through the timber up a steep hillside, and halted just behind a low fence along the timberline, about 300 yards in front of the Union positions between Bartow on the right and Evans on the left.²³

The Confederate's battle line was not in an enviable position, for it was subject to artillery fire which became increas-

²²Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 13.

²³Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 11; Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I (New York, 1884-1887), 207, 247.

ingly effective, and the number of Federal infantry was constantly growing. Glancing in front of their line, the Alabamians spied "immense" numbers of Yankees. Still, the Fourth had hardly rested along the fence when General Bee rode from the left and ordered the forward movement to continue into a cornfield where only scant protection was offered by the low corn shoots, about two feet high. There the regiment lay prone, rising to fire at will.²⁴

At Confederate headquarters, when the firing swelled in volume by approximately 11 a.m., it was obvious that there was a desperate battle raging on the left flank. First Johnston and then Beauregard hurried off to see. They passed many men coming toward the rear who must have reported the precarious situation beyond Young's Branch. It took an hour and a half for the generals to reach Henry House Hill, and during that period, a veritable "bulletstorm" was directed against the Confederate line.²⁵

While the commanding officers changed their position, before 11:30 a.m., a Federal column under Colonel William T. Sherman had discovered a little-used ford across Bull Run between the Stone Bridge and Evans' new position to the northwest. Sherman crossed and was able to outflank the Confederates from the east. Just how many of the enemy the defenders were now facing from their front and right they did not know, but from the volume of fire and the growing number of casualties, they reckoned it was many.²⁶

Bee's men were in their position for about an hour before they found that "they were overlapped on each flank by the continually arriving enemy, [and] General Bee fell back to the position from which he had moved to rescue Evans — crossing the valley, closely pressed by the Federal army."²⁷ The retreat was accomplished while the Fourth Alabama regiment lay in the cornfield. It soon was clear, however, that the rest of the Third Brigade, with Bartow's and Evans' men, had melted into the woods to the south. Both flanks of the

²⁴Goldsby, "Official Report;" Coles, "History," Chapter II, 5-6.

²⁵Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 61-62; and Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 11.

²⁶Vaughn, "Memories."

²⁷Johnson, *Battles and Leaders*, I, 247. Many soldiers did not stop at the second line of defense on Henry House Hill, but they continued toward the rear, spreading tales of defeat (*Campaigns*, I, 185).

Fourth Alabama were "literally hanging in the air without a support." On three occasions, Union ranks advanced, only to be repulsed by musket fire. But the ever increasing pressure, especially from Sherman to the east, forced the Fourth to fall back after having occupied their line for what had seemed an eternity. The regiment moved rapidly, but not precipitately. The "gallant Col. Jones . . . sat conspicuously on his horse, as calm as a statue," providing strength and courage, inspiring his regiment to remain in place until the last possible moment, and preventing a rout.²⁸

The Alabamians retired in good order, recrossing the fence, passing back through the woods, and descending the hill in front of Young's Branch. After fording the small stream and reforming, they observed a large troop formation to the east, about one-quarter of a mile from the position they had just quitted, approximately in the area where reinforcements were expected. The Fourth believed these troops to be friendly at first. However, when the flag was unfurled, the strangers opened a murderous fire which killed and wounded several men, included in the latter Lieutenant Colonel Law and Major Scott. The fire was returned with interest, but the exchange had left the Fourth Alabama without field officers and still exposed.²⁹

Following the incident of Young's Branch, the Fourth moved up Henry House Hill, which they found just recently occupied by Wade Hampton's Legion, and retired through a wood toward an open field where they stood at order arms to rest and await orders. It was at this point, about 12:30 p.m., that Generals Johnston and Beauregard rode up and set about immediately to reorganize their defenses on the hill. Most of the Bee and Bartow commands had taken refuge in a thicket-shrouded ravine to the southeast of the Robinson house where they huddled in great confusion. Johnston spied a regiment in good order and asked which it was. The reply indicated that it was the remainder of the Fourth Alabama Regiment, that all its field officers were either dead or wounded, and that none of the company captains had taken command. Johnston ordered the regiment into line:

²⁸Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" Goldsby, "Official Report."

²⁹Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" and Goldsby, "Official Report."

Just at this point General [sic] Bartow, bleeding from a wound in the foot, his horse wounded and bleeding, said: "General Johnston, I am hard pressed on my right [the ravine] and I cannot hold my position without reinforcements." The general replied "You must at all hazards hold your position, and if you need reinforcements this regiment here," (pointing to the Fourth) "will support you." Bartow turned his horse and rode back to his command. General Johnson then placing himself by the colors, moved the Fourth through the scrub pine timber, placed the regiment in a washout in the rear of the Georgians and left us, shrouded by the thick pine bushes."³⁰

Having retreated from their advanced position, the Alabamians were in poor spirits, and Captain Edward D. Tracy [Company I, Huntsville North Alabamians] spoke to the regiment to offer inspiration. He knew that heavy losses had hurt morale, and he used all his eloquence to encourage. Meanwhile, General Beauregard was doing much the same; men were continuously deserting the lines, and the general rode up and down making speeches. Subsequently when all units present were properly positioned, Beauregard persuaded Johnston to retire to the Lewis House and direct reinforcements to the front.³¹

As fighting continued, the Fourth lost contact with Bartow. In order to follow the course of battle, the regiment pulled out of the thicket and moved out into the open. The men rested and sent out water details when General Bee rode up looking for any of his brigade still in formation. Captains Porter King and Richard Clarke [Company D, Uniontown Canebrake Rifle Guards] answered that he had found what remained of the Fourth Alabama. Bee said, "Come with me and go yonder

³⁰Ward, "Fourth Alabama." Johnson, *Battles and Leaders*, I, 248, relates that when General Johnston came "near this ground where Bee was reforming and Jackson deploying his brigade, I saw a regiment in line with ordered arms and facing to the front, but 200 or 300 yards in rear of its proper place. On inquiry I learned that it had lost all its field officers; so, riding on its left flank, I easily marched it to its place."

³¹Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 67-69; Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 15; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 36.

where Jackson stands like a stone wall."³² Agreement was unanimous, although the captains asked leave to allow the water details to return. The water was distributed quickly, General Bee mounted and placed himself on the left, and moved the regiment forward toward Jackson. During the movement, however, John Pelham's artillery train was changing position toward the rear and cut the Fourth in half. Company D and part of Company G, with General Bee, obliqued to the right for about one hundred yards where Bee was mortally wounded. The rest of the regiment simply proceeded straight ahead into the thick of the fighting, unaware of Bee's direction.³³

The battle for Henry House Hill continued for about two hours after the "stone wall" incident and would probably have been unsuccessful had it not been for the strong resistance offered by Jackson's First Brigade, Hampton's Legion, and units like the Fourth Alabama. The line held however, and at 2 p.m. Beauregard ordered the right of his line to move onto the plateau while Jackson pierced the enemy center. This initial success was undone shortly after, and as the Federal front continually expanded, it seemed inevitable that the Confederates would be enveloped. The sun was scorchingly hot, the Southerners were exhausted, and it was extremely difficult to keep up a sustained exchange of fire. Beauregard ordered another advance onto the plateau which finally secured it, and it was probably at this point that Bee was lost.³⁴

The turning point of First Manassas was the arrival after 3 p.m. of Col. Arnold Elzey's Fourth Brigade, 1700 men. Once the latter was in place, Beauregard ordered a third advance

³²There are many versions of this remark; this one is reported because a member of the regiment recorded it (Ward, "Fourth Alabama"). Jackson's brigade had arrived on Henry House Hill after noon to form a defensive line between the Henry and Robinson Houses (*Campaigns*, I, 187). However, an entirely different version of Bee's remark is also recorded: "Being told that 'it was what remained of the 4th Alabama,' [Bee] replied, with an expressive gesture, 'this is all of my brigade that I can find—will you follow me back to where the firing is going on?' We said, 'to the death.'" (Goldsby, "Official Report.")

³³The regiment did not rejoin; "notwithstanding, all the companies pitched in with other regiments and fought bravely til the enemy was repulsed and the day was won." (Letter, Richard Clarke to Bettie Lou Clarke, 14 August 1861, news clipping, *Uniontown Herald*, Smith Papers, Scrapbook II. See also Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" Goldsby, "Official Report.")

³⁴Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 17-18.

which swept the Yankees from the hill. By 4 p.m., other reinforcements had arrived, and Beauregard ordered the whole line forward once more. With great spirit, the irregular Confederate line forced the Union soldiers to retreat in extreme haste in all available directions towards Bull Run Creek. "The rout had now become general and complete."³⁵

Following the victory, great confusion reigned among Southern commands. The Fourth Alabama had remained on the field until the close of battle in support of Jackson, although the extent of their participation is not known. Their ranks had been thinned considerably by exposure to several hours of heavy fire,³⁶ and they did not participate in the pursuit of the fleeing yankees. They waited near the Lewis House, Johnston's headquarters, where they learned of the final victory.³⁷

The Fourth marched back to Manassas that night in a bitter mood, feeling disgraced for having quit their line in front of Young's Branch that morning. However, on the following day, they heard nothing but praise for themselves. For having held their ground for an hour against the Federal advance, they had won time for reinforcements to be placed on Henry House Hill which led on to ultimate victory. Later, General Samuel Heintzelman, commanding a Union brigade, wrote that the responsibility for checking his advance was shared by Evans and "an Alabama regiment," the Fourth.³⁸ When complimented for their efforts, a young member of the regiment from Huntsville remarked "that they did not deserve so much credit after all, for they thought all the while they were fighting one regiment, which was marched up four times, instead of four several fresh regiments."³⁹

The Manassas victory was important to the Confederacy, for it demonstrated that the United States Army could not as

³⁵Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 18-20.

³⁶The regiment lost 38 killed and 208 wounded (Willis Brewer, *Alabama: Her History, Resources, War Record, and Public Men from 1540 to 1872* [Montgomery, 1872], 594).

³⁷Ward, "Fourth Alabama."

³⁸*War of the Rebellion. A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, II (Washington, D. C., 1880), 402-404.

³⁹"Heroes of Manassas," news clipping, *New Orleans Delta*, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

yet encroach on Southern territory, despite their size and superior weaponry. President Jefferson Davis, who had come to Manassas on the hour of triumph, reported that "the enemy was routed and fled perceptibly," and that a large quantity of arms and equipment was taken. The Richmond Congress was elated and resolved to make "prompt and patriotic efforts . . . to make provisions for the wounded, and entitle them to our gratitude." Sympathy was extended to families of fallen soldiers, but generally the South was exuberant.⁴⁰

To praise their soldiers, Generals Johnston and Beauregard overflowed with oratory. "Soldiers! We congratulate you on an event which ensures the liberty of our country. We congratulate every man of you, whose glorious privilege it was to participate in this triumph of courage and of truth — to fight in the battle of Manassas."⁴¹

Unhappily, the Manassas event was calamitous in other ways. It produced great dissension between civilian and military leaders over the progress and conduct of the war. At issue first was the non-pursuit of the Federal army into Washington. Never resolved, the question left dissatisfaction in many minds over the quality of Southern leadership. Furthermore, large numbers of men wounded at Manassas were not receiving proper care, and men in camp were falling prey to a variety of diseases which the medical staff could not alleviate. Attacks of measles had reduced the Fourth Alabama prior to Manassas, and afterward, they suffered from yellow jaundice and every disease imaginable.⁴² Col. Egbert Jones, for example, died after a lingering illness on September 3, 1861 at Culpeper Courthouse.⁴³

Despite plagues of disease, the Fourth Alabama was excited over their part in Manassas. They had been bound together "as a perfect unit, which nothing could tear asunder."⁴⁴

⁴⁰"The Battle of Manas[s]as," news clipping, *Selma Reporter*, July 22, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

⁴¹"The War. Address to the Army from Generals Johnston and Beauregard. . . .," news clipping, July 25, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

⁴²Coles, "History," Chapter III, 10-11.

⁴³"Heroes of Manassas."

⁴⁴Coles, "History," Chapter III, 19-20.

They were being regularly supplied with clothing and food by hometown friends and relatives. Capt. Richard Clarke wrote to his daughter that "I hear good accounts of your industrious efforts in behalf of my gallant company [Company D, Canebrake Rifle Guards]. I am extremely pleased with your endeavors . . . in behalf of the gallant boys who have left the comforts of home and the endearments of family to risk life and limb in the service of their country."⁴⁵ Marius Smith [private, Company G, Marion Rifles], who joined the Fourth in late August, called his people "the best people in the world" for their part in keeping his regiment well-supplied. He added that he did not know of anyone "who would not shed his own life's blood in their defense."⁴⁶

Spirits in camp were high, and many soldiers believed the war would end before Christmas. Expectations for battle within a short time were enhanced by a standing order to keep two days' rations, cooked and on hand in haversacks, at all times. It was a very uncertain kind of life for the regiment, but there were no engagements until the affair at Ball's Bluff when Nathan Evans, promoted to colonel, defeated a Federal force as it attempted to cross the Potomac. There was little to divert General Johnston from what he believed to be his main objective, to train his army.⁴⁷

Drill never seemed to end. While Major W. H. C. Whiting had been appointed to replace General Bee, the Fourth was still without regimental grade officers. Since there was no one who could drill larger units than companies, General Johnston detached a Major Allston to duty with the Fourth. However, as the latter was a cavalry officer, he was later supplemented by Major O. K. McLemore, "a splendid drill master, in fact the best the regiment ever had, and . . . a fine disciplinarian."⁴⁸

The camp rose to reveille at 5:30 a.m. Roll call later was an amusing sight, for there were no standard uniforms available in the regiment, and all manner of costumes were displayed. Drill practice came at 9 a.m. and again at 3 p.m.

⁴⁵Letter, Richard Clarke to Bettie Lou Clarke, 14 August 1861.

⁴⁶Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, August 22, 1861, Smith Papers.

⁴⁷Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 111.

⁴⁸Coles, "History," Chapter III, 3.

Dress parade followed at 5:30 p.m., and then came the evening meal: "we then eat supper, light our pipes and smoke awhile, then comes roll call again, after which we all retired into a state of retiracy."⁴⁹

By early October, President Davis had met with Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Gustavus W. Smith, to decide on the possibility of an advance into the north, particularly Maryland. Popular demands in the South called for an immediate offensive, but the commanders reported that reinforcing and re-equipping the army for the task was impossible until the coming of Spring.⁵⁰ When the expected maneuvers did not materialize, the Fourth prepared to go into winter quarters near Dumfries in order to support large siege guns, "cockpit batteries," designed to close off navigation along the Potomac.

Camp Law was an elevated area occupied by quarters that were more permanent than the previous tents. Colonel Goldsby, newly promoted, looked to clearing off the grounds and laying out company streets. Subsequently, the regiment had "quite a respectable little town, with rather a variegated assortment of buildings, mostly tents with chimneys[,] intermixed with cabins."⁵¹ The troops began to write home for heavy gloves and warm shirts, and other items, as pen and ink, which would provide diversion during the long, winter months.⁵²

During the forced inactivity at Dumfries, the health of the regiment improved somewhat, and the regiment was growing in numbers. Only a few soldiers remained in sick bay "down at old man Merchant's hotel," or in the general hospital at Richmond for Alabama troops. By the end of November, most of the men had what they needed for a comfortable winter, and things from home were still arriving.⁵³

By December, 1861, the Confederate government was considering ways and means to encourage enlistments in the army. A Furlough and Bounty Act, signed December 11, 1861, was meant to assure re-enlistments for those twelve month volun-

⁴⁹Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, October 29, 1861, Smith Papers.

⁵⁰Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 115-118.

⁵¹Coles, "History," Chapter III, 7.

⁵²Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, October 29, 1861; and letter, Richard Clarke to Bettie Lou Clarke, August 14, 1861.

⁵³Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, November 22, 1861, Smith Papers.

teers whose terms expired in the late winter or early spring. A cash bounty of \$50 was offered along with a sixty days' furlough to an enlisted man or non-commissioned officer who agreed to serve for the war's duration or three years. In addition, men who wished to change service organizations were allowed to do so. And finally, after re-enlistments were accomplished, regiments were promised elections for company and field officers, although all commissions thereafter would be filled by direct promotion.⁵⁴

The Fourth Alabama Regiment re-enlisted for three years in January, 1862,⁵⁵ and General Johnston began to grant leaves under the provisions of the Furlough and Bounty Act. Much of February and March were used up with the Confederate Army in depleted strength, and there was some doubt that all original regiments would re-enlist at all. General Johnston feared a general deterioration in command as popular but incompetent officers were elected by promises of relaxed discipline.⁵⁶

Some justification for fears of building the army up to strength were indicated. Soldiers on leave were expected to recruit,⁵⁷ but the difficulty was great. In Selma, Capt. R. V. Kidd [Company A, Governor's Guard] advertised in the papers, "Fourth Alabama: Recruits Wanted!"⁵⁸ And William Robbins [lieutenant, Company G, Marion Rifles] wrote that "recruiting is the hardest business I ever tried" and that "too many are compromising their patriotism. . . ."⁵⁹ However, when in March the men returned with their recruits, and when the sick and wounded had recovered, the regiment was "very much augmented."⁶⁰

From Washington, McClellan's Army of the Potomac began its long-expected movement into Virginia after the warm weather dried the roads sufficiently to allow his army to pass. Johnston knew that the enemy was larger and better equipped, and, alerted to the Federal advance, he decided to pull out

⁵⁴Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 130-131.

⁵⁵Brewer, *Alabama*, 594.

⁵⁶Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 133-134.

⁵⁷Coles, "History," Chapter III, 13.

⁵⁸*Daily Reporter* (Selma), March 11, 1862, p. 3, Alabama Archives.

⁵⁹Letter, William Robbins to Porter King, March 25, 1862, Smith Papers.

⁶⁰Coles, "History," Chapter III, 13.

from his several camps at Evansport, Dumfries, the Occoquan, and Manassas to head south. Johnston reached the Rappahannock River and Rappahannock Station by March 11, 1862, where a second line of defense was established.⁶¹ The evacuation from Confederate camps was so precipitous, however, that much equipment and personal baggage was left behind and destroyed so as not to fall into enemy hands.

Nothing immediately developed as a threat from the Union army move, and General Johnston changed his position once more better to thwart any offensive which might develop against eastern Virginia. His army was being thoroughly reorganized, and commanders were shuffled extensively. None of the brigades involved at Manassas remained entirely under the man who had led it there.⁶²

The first year of war had brought tremendous changes to the Confederate soldier, particularly in his outlook. No one appreciated the extensive hours of drill and preparation, and soldiers who had earlier romanticized the war were by the end of their first year's experience willing to "give \$17,000 and a mule to get home once more."⁶³ Certainly the war was bringing much grief to a Confederacy which had only a few months earlier chased the Yankees out of Manassas. The Federal army was advancing into northern Virginia while General Johnston was retreating; winter had visited a string of disasters on the South, such as losses at Forts Henry and Donelson. And it was obvious to all that the war was going to last much longer.

In the Fourth Alabama, these sentiments could be read in the soldiers' letters. They had enlisted for a war which they expected to consist of simply "one big battle" which would end by Christmas, 1861. Manassas had come and gone. It had offered a bitter-sweet taste of victory, but the flavor was soured by continuous inactivity, or retreat, or defeat. Still, most of the southern soldiers were in good spirits. Their cause was just, and they would continue their crusade.

⁶¹E. B. Long, *Civil War Day By Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865* (Garden City, New York, 1971), 180.

⁶²Brewer, *Alabama*, 594; and Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 157.

⁶³Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, May 7, 1862, Smith Papers; and Coles, "History," Chapter III, 4.

THE ALLIANCE IN POLITICS:
THE ALABAMA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1890

by

Karl Louis Rodabaugh

When in 1890 the Alliance entered its large, dissatisfied agrarian following in the lists of Alabama politics, the resulting division among Democrats threatened to destroy the Bourbon political system. The Alliance involvement, obviously a serious matter, reflected the stage of development of agrarian discontent. For by that time, farmers had come to recognize deep bonds of identity with their brethren; they had the same sense of disadvantage, the same feeling of oppression, and adhered to the same agrarian ideology. Farmers saw the same enemy pressing down upon their ranks, armed with sinister weapons — special corporate privileges, inequitable tax structures, control of the monetary system, bribery, corruption, and monopoly — all the advantages of political power. With collapse of the Alliance economic cooperative movement imminent by 1890, the Alliansemen concluded that, if the condition of agriculture were to be improved, and if their views were to be implemented, the mechanisms of the political system would have to be geared in their favor. United under the secret bonds of Alliance brotherhood, they would attempt to strike down the foes of the producers of plenty, and send their brothers to the hall of government to uphold freedom, equality, and righteousness — and to preserve the rural way of life.

Prior to the entry of the alliance into Alabama politics there was a period of fermentation. Since its appearance in the state, the brotherhood, fearing dissension and the danger of the Negro vote if divisive issues were raised within the Democratic party, had followed the national organization's policy and ostensibly rejected political involvement. But as Alliansemen became very numerous in some localities, they became aware of their significance and sought local representation of their views from the Democrats. Oligarchic control of county politics by Bourbon courthouse rings, however, convinced the agrarians that they would have to gain possession of the local party machinery in order to give their proposals a hearing. Toward that end, the Alliance, in 1888, captured

the Democracy in Bibb, Shelby, and other strong Alliance counties. Although it failed in several other counties, where successful the brotherhood began nominating its own candidates for the state legislature through the Democratic party machinery.¹

The Bourbons reacted to the ominous signs of agrarian political activity. Of course, the Democratic response was as varied as the party's patchwork composition, but important reverberations were clear. Fearing the political consequence of an open attack on the powerful Alliance, the Bourbons carefully sought the approval of the agrarians, while simultaneously criticizing the growing political mission of the Alliance.² In 1888, responding to an invitation to attend a Shelby County Alliance barbecue, Senator John T. Morgan glowingly praised the brotherhood and regretted he could not join in the festivities.³ His reaction was understandable, for the temper of Alliance political involvement, at that time, called only for activity that would secure favorable legislation from the Democrats. State Alliance president S. M. Adams, a loyal Democrat, supported his party and advised Alliancemen to vote for honest Democrats favoring agrarian interests.⁴ So the Bourbons, plainly currying favor for themselves among the agrarians, gave "verbal assent to the program of reforms demanded by the . . . Farmer's [sic] Alliance." But their insincerity soon became apparent when "they failed to honor their pledges with action."⁵ For the Bourbons had developed another way of dealing with the threat of the Alliance.

Soon the Bourbons employed racism in their fight against the agrarians, warning that political division of the whites,

¹William Warren Rogers, *The One-Gallused Rebellion: Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 166-167; Henry Pelham Martin, "A History of Politics in Clay County during the Period of Populism from 1888-1896" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1936), 2-3; Thomas Kermit Hearn, "The Populist Movement in Marshall County," (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1935), 29-30.

²C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (2nd. rev. ed., New York, 1966), 78.

³Montgomery *Advertiser*, July 15, 1888, cited in William Warren Rogers, "The Farmers' Alliance in Alabama," *Alabama Review*, XV (January, 1962), 8. The *Advertiser* was the organ of the state Democratic party and the most influential newspaper in Alabama.

⁴Centreville *Bibb Blade*, May 10, 1888, cited Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 166.

⁵Woodward, *Strange Career of Jim Crow*, 78.

which would stem from Alliance agitation, would bring dangers to white rule.⁶ Yet the Bourbons, still fearful of arousing farmer opposition, first resorted to a flank attack on the vulnerable black Alliance. In an effort to create division in the Alliance ranks, the *Montgomery Advertiser* said, "The white alliance will have no lot or part in the colored alliances."⁷ In a clear attempt to turn Allianceman away from the brotherhood, the *Advertiser* declared, "the white people of Alabama don't want any more negro influence in their affairs than they have already had, and they won't have it."⁸ Even the *Montgomery Alliance Journal*, which realized that the Negro Alliance posed a threat to white agrarian unity, embraced the hope that "there will be no more of these organizations effected," and assured the whites that it was "no more in favor of Negro Alliances than . . . the so called Negro Masonic Lodges, and would recognize one as quick as the other."⁹

By 1889, the Alliance fully realized the nature and increasing force of Bourbon resistance to large-scale agrarian organization. Surveying the field, it would have seen that it was the dominant agricultural group in Alabama, with almost all others supporting its aggressive political activities. Also apparent was the Bourbon use of the Negro threat, which could intimidate the Alliance following. Knowing that Bourbon charges that it menaced white supremacy would be averted if it captured the Democratic Party from within, the Alliance sought more vigorously to gain control of the Democracy.¹⁰

The political plans of the Alliance became clear at its annual convention of 1889. Meeting in Auburn, August 7 - 9, the assembly of state agrarian leaders approved the constitution of the new Farmers' and Laborers' Union of America, thereby officially merging the Agricultural Wheel and the

⁶Charles Grayson Summersell, "Kolb and the Populist Revolt as Viewed by Newspapers," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XIX (1957), 383-384.

⁷*Montgomery Advertiser*, October 3, 1889.

⁸*Ibid.*, December 22, 1889.

⁹*Montgomery Alliance Journal*, cited in William Warren Rogers, "The Negro Alliance in Alabama," *Journal of Negro History*, XLV (1960), 43.

¹⁰Allen J. Going, *Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 1874-1890* (University, Ala., 1951), 106; Robert D. Ward and William Warren Rogers, *Labor Revolt in Alabama: The Great Strike of 1894* (University, Ala., 1965), 39-40.

Farmers' Alliance in Alabama.¹¹ The convention also selected delegates to a national convention — of the Southern Alliance, the Northern Alliance, the Colored Alliance, and the Knights of Labor — to be held in St. Louis in December.¹² The assemblage was honored by the presence of Southern Alliance president Dr. C. W. Macune, who was in Alabama to give direction to the State Alliance efforts to humble the jutebagging trust.¹³ The convention adopted strong resolutions castigating the trust, and, as a result of the *Advertiser's* denunciations of the Alliance for its earlier boycott of the jutebagging trust, viciously condemned the *Advertiser* and its conservative policy. This widened the breach between the Bourbons and the Alliance and, finally, brought it into the open. Strategy was discussed for electing agrarians in the next state race and capturing control of the 1890 Democratic State Convention. When considering gubernatorial possibilities, the convention endorsed Reuben F. Kolb, Commissioner of Agriculture since 1887, as a farmer who would make a good governor.¹⁴

Kolb — a prominent Democrat — had experienced the difficulties of post-war agriculture so common to Alabama farmers. Upon return from the Civil War he undertook the management of the family cotton plantation, but the 1873 panic and low prices soon forced him to give up planting. Briefly he became a cotton factor, then a merchant. Convinced, fin-

¹¹John Bunyan Clark, *Populism in Alabama* (Auburn, Ala., 1927), 81. The National Wheel and the Southern Alliance officially merged in December, 1888. The new organization adopted the name of Farmers' and Laborers' Union of America. See: W. Scott Morgan, *History of the Wheel and Alliance, and the Impending Revolution* (Ft. Scott, Kans., 1889), 125-127.

¹²Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 87-88n. Delegates were: Reuben F. Kolb, Commissioner of Agriculture; Samuel M. Adams, Alabama State Alliance president; Major J. H. Harris; Hector D. Lane, editor of the *Huntsville Mercury*; T. J. Carlisle; and J. H. Higgins, representing the Wheel.

¹³Morgan, *Wheel and Alliance*, 343. Jute manufacturers raised the price of their bagging in 1888, whereupon the Alabama State Alliance initiated a boycott of jute-bagging that forced the price of jute from 13¢ down to 5¢. At first, Alliancemen were very enthusiastic about the campaign against jute manufacturers. But as the price of jute fell, they lost some of their former spirit and discontinued buying cotton-bagging that the State Alliance was handling. See: Rogers, "Farmers' Alliance in Alabama," 17, and Houston Cole, "A History of Populism in Tuscaloosa County" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1927), 45.

¹⁴Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 81, 83-84, 63.

ally, of the hopelessness of the entire cotton business, Kolb planted chiefly watermelons, and prospered.¹⁵

By the time he became Commissioner of Agriculture, Kolb had been active for years in the agricultural affairs of Alabama. He supported the Agricultural Society and the Alliance, participating in the Alliance's battle against the jute-bagging trust, and served as president of the Farmers' National Congress. He also joined in the movement to make the Alliance a strong, central voice for the farmers. As commissioner, Kolb called for cooperation between Midwestern capital and Alabama farmers to bring prosperity to the state. An avid proponent of scientific agriculture and agricultural education, he sought to publicize these things, as well as the activities of his department, in numerous pamphlets and bulletins. Through the medium of his publications, Kolb came into contact with the farmers, who depended upon the reports on agricultural and economic conditions in his bulletins, and who seem to have accepted him as their leader.¹⁶

As his following swelled and the agrarian movement became increasingly involved in politics, Kolb began looking ahead to the 1890 gubernatorial race. He took every opportunity, therefore, to meet farm groups and speak on agricultural and political topics. Agrarian agitation had influenced passage of an act in 1889 that provided for local institutes to raise the educational level of Alabama's farmers. As Commissioner of Agriculture, Kolb held legal responsibility for organizing and directing the institutes, so with state funds allocated for the purpose, he hired able and popular men to lecture on agricultural topics. An excellent orator himself, Kolb spoke frequently at the institutes, where he called for the farmers to become involved in politics, criticized Bourbon control of state government, and advocated the election of a farmer to the governor's office. In addition, Kolb, making use of his position as president of the Farmers' National Congress, convinced

¹⁵See: Ruth S. Cammack, "Reuben Francis Kolb: His Influence on Agriculture in Alabama" (M.S. thesis, Auburn University, 1941); Charles Grayson Summersell, "A Life of Reuben F. Kolb" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1930); and William Warren Rogers, "Reuben F. Kolb: Agricultural Leader of the New South," *Agricultural History*, XXII (April, 1958), 109-119.

¹⁶Cammack, "Kolb," 36-37, 4-5; Morgan, *Wheel and Alliance*, 349-351; John Sparkman, "The Kolb-Oates Campaign of 1894" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1924), 18.

the group's 1889 convention to adopt resolutions listing the farmers' grievances against banks, railroads, and trusts. Also due to his influence, the Farmers' Congress advised farmers to resort to the ballot and vote for men that supported the battle against the trust and promised legislation for farmers.¹⁷

While Kolb was striving to bring more farmers into Alabama politics, the Southern Alliance (following its merger with the Wheel) had moved toward greater involvement in national politics. Toward that end, a convention stemming from Southern Alliance efforts convened in St. Louis, in December 1889, to coalesce the major protest groups into one massive political movement. Kolb and S. M. Adams, President of the Alabama State Alliance, led the Alabama delegation. The Southern Alliance's purpose in calling the St. Louis Convention was to gain a broader following to use as a tool for capturing the Democratic party in the South. Indeed, the Southern Alliance, dedicated to the one-party system, feared growing talk of a third party movement, and believed that a new party would only work against its goal of controlling the Democracy.¹⁸

As the delegates at St. Louis discussed their respective views, in an attempt to arrive at a common platform, wide differences arose to block merger. The Northern Alliance objected to the exclusion of Negroes from the Southern Alliance and to its secrecy. But the Southern Alliance considered secrecy the source of its national unity and refused to drop it. It was willing to strike the word *white* from the membership clause, leaving the question of Negro eligibility to the state Alliances. The southerners, nevertheless, held out for exclusion of blacks from the Supreme Council of any new organization, and would concede this point only if it were the sole barrier to unification.¹⁹

¹⁷Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 379; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 77-78; Frederick Emory Haynes, *Third Party Movements since the Civil War, with Special Reference to Iowa: A Study in Social Politics* (Iowa City, Ia., 1916), 226-228; Theodore Saloutos, *Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1960), 103.

¹⁸John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party* (Minneapolis, 1931), 113-114, 122.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 119-122; Fred A. Shannon, *The Farmers' Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897* (New York, 1945), 317.

However, other difficulties did exist. Sectional animosity was a factor, for the northerners feared absorption by the larger Southern Alliance; but economic differences were more significant. The Southern Alliance sought the subtreasury scheme²⁰ and monetary inflation as primary goals, while the more prosperous eastern farmers in the Northern Alliance saw no urgency in the money question and wanted instead new laws circumscribing the production and sale of recently developed synthetic food products. Such laws, however, promised to limit the increasing uses for southern cottonseed oil. In addition, northerners grew perishables that would not be as adjustable to storage under the subtreasury plan as tobacco and cotton. When the two alliances realized that they could not compromise their differences, they abandoned the proposed merger and retired to prepare separate, although similar, platforms.²¹

The Southern Alliance platform, called the St. Louis Demands, brought together those proposals deemed most urgent by the protest movement. And it served as the program of the new National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union — formed by loose unification of the Knights of Labor and the Southern Alliance. Financial planks predominated: it was urged that national banks be abolished and that legal tender treasury notes be substituted for national bank notes, these

²⁰At the St. Louis Convention, Southern Alliance president Dr. C. W. Macune offered the report of the Committee on the Monetary System, which advocated implementing the subtreasury system as the first step toward gaining equal rights for agrarian interests. The subtreasury plan was designed to use the power of the federal government to correct southern credit deficiencies. Under the system, government storage facilities would be established in counties producing at least \$500,000 worth of farm products for sale; farmers could deposit non-perishable crops in the government facilities and receive certificates for 80 percent of the total local value of their goods; these certificates would enable the farmers to get loans at nominal interest rates. It was believed that, as a result of the subtreasuries, more money would come into circulation at crop-marketing times, halting the depression of farm prices. See: John D. Hicks, "The Subtreasury: A Forgotten Plan for the Relief of Agriculture," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XV (December, 1928), 256-358. For an account of the origin of the subtreasury idea, crediting it to Harry Skinner, Greenville, North Carolina populist, see: Robert Wayne Smith, "A Rhetorical Analysis of the Populist Movement in North Carolina, 1892-1896" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957), 25-26.

²¹H. C. Nixon, "The Cleavage within the Farmer's Alliance Movement," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XV (June, 1928), 22-25.

new notes to be issued in sufficient quantity to put the nation's business on a cash basis; free coinage of silver was advocated to produce \$50 per capita circulating medium; and a key plank demanded establishment of the subtreasury system; an end was sought to speculation in agricultural futures, to alien landholdings, to excessive land ownership by railroads, and to inequitable taxes. Further appeals called for economy and honesty in government and government ownership of transportation and communication facilities. Finally, to implement their views, the newly-wed organizations proclaimed that, henceforth, farmers and laborers would cooperate to elect to office only those men pledged to support the St. Louis Demands.²²

The St. Louis Demands produced an immediate reaction in Alabama, for the decision to seek the election of only those men promising to support the Demands immediately was called a threat to Democratic unity and to white supremacy. Alliances held meetings to discuss the demands, and a few even denounced the Alabama delegates for being a party to the convention results. One local alliance went so far as to declare that a Yankee plot was underway to use the Alliance for destroying the Democratic party, while others adopted resolutions demanding that the brotherhood eschew politics and pledging allegiance to the Democracy.²³ The press especially castigated the appeal for government ownership as dangerously socialistic.²⁴ And the subtreasury proposal received elaborate criticism. The *Mobile Register*, denying that the program for crop deposits and loans would benefit the poor farmers, pictured it as a definite boom to speculators. Because they failed to comprehend fully the subtreasury plan, many Alliances were, undoubtedly, easy prey for the *Register's* logic.²⁵ The State Alliance, perhaps mindful of this fact and certainly aware of the controversy spawned by the Demands, decided to forgo the issue of official acceptance until after the next state elections.²⁶

²²Hicks, *Populist Revolt*, 427-430, 124-125; Shannon, *Farmers' Last Frontier*, 318.

²³Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 90-91; Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 384-385.

²⁴Montgomery *Advertiser*, August 9, 1890.

²⁵William Warren Rogers, "Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1959), 329.

²⁶Tuscaloosa *Times*, August 12, 1890.

Upon returning from St. Louis, the Alliance delegates met with a rising crescendo of criticism. Kolb — whose political fences had been in excellent repair before the convention — was charged with supporting treason against the Democratic party. Finding it necessary to defend himself, he affirmed his belief in white supremacy and said:

I voted against the entire series (of Demands), good and bad alike, because those to which I objected had not been eliminated . . . I yield to no man in my fealty and devotion to the Democratic Party, and I do not believe that the utmost ingenuity of my enemies can shake the faith of the people of Alabama in the soundness of my Democracy.²⁷

Kolb then announced his candidacy for the gubernatorial nomination as a Democrat.²⁸

A joint statement issued by Kolb and most of the other delegates answered other questions raised by the Demands. The men said they voted to leave the issue of Negro eligibility to the state alliances, denied that any steps had been taken at St. Louis toward the formation of a new party, and declared that any action by the Alliance leading to the establishment of a third party would violate its principles.²⁹

Kolb's candidacy, the Alliance in politics, the St. Louis Demands, and other important developments promised to make 1890 an interesting political year. In May, the Democrats would choose a successor to Governor Thomas Seay, who was completing his second term.³⁰ But conflict between the black-belt and North Alabama over legislative representation threatened to split the party into sectional camps, while declining agricultural prices and growing labor unrest added to the tension.

Labor protests appeared in the 1880s and gradually acquired a relationship to politics. As early as 1887, strikes in

²⁷Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, January 9, 1890, quoting *Montgomery Advertiser*.

²⁸Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 380.

²⁹Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, January 9, 1890, quoting *Birmingham Age-Herald*.

³⁰It was Democratic party policy to re-nominate the incumbent governor to a second two-year term, but that was traditionally the maximum term. See: Going, *Bourbon Democracy*, *passim*.

the mineral regions around Birmingham protested wage reductions by the mining industry, but a lack of organization prevented any success. The Knights of Labor had tried to organize Alabama labor in the early 1880s — even promoting separate Negro assemblies — but the organization never gained more than 400 members.³¹ The Knights, however, by appealing to increasingly resentful laborers, managed to form a Labor Party of Alabama in 1888 that called for higher wages, better working conditions, honest election laws, reforms in the convict lease system, and government ownership of the transportation and communication networks.³² Some members of the Wheel and of the Alliance joined the new party, but numerous factors prevented widespread success. First among the causes for failure was the deterioration of the Knights, for as they declined, the Knights “came to represent the employing, middle-class farmer, rather than the worker either on the farm or in the city.”³³ Moreover, no real unity among the laborers ever had been achieved. Yet the Labor party, although it lacked size and rapidly disintegrated, served as a first effort to bring Alabama’s laborers into politics.

By 1890, as prices began to drop from the comparatively higher levels of the late 1880s, Alabama began feeling the initial tremors of world-wide economic collapse. If Murray and Susan Stedman are correct in assuming that the first price declines induce large portions of the electorate to vote on the basis of economic distress, then the state was ripe for the appearance of a political force deprecating the existing system and appealing to the dissatisfied. The tone of the Alliance, indeed, pointed in that direction. State Alliance president S. M. Adams blamed low prices on a contracted currency and faulty legislation, and called for new laws to correct the ills of the financial system. Following his example, a large agrarian contingent felt that the distress they suffered could

³¹Frederick Meyers, “The Knights of Labor in the South,” *Southern Economic Journal*, VI (1939-1940), 479, 482-485; Ward and Rogers, *Labor Revolt in Alabama*, 23-28. Efforts to organize Negro labor in Alabama were met with violence. See; Sidney F. Kessler, “The Organization of Negroes in the Knights of Labor,” *Journal of Negro History* XXXVII (1952), 255, 264.

³²Ward and Rogers, *Labor Revolt in Alabama*, 37-38; Clark *Populism in Alabama*, 79.

³³Daniel M. Feins, “Labor’s Role in the Populist Movement, 1890-96” (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1939), 29.

be traced to political origins and were ready to seek political remedies.³⁴

With unrest increasing and strong factions plotting to control the Democratic party, the structure of intra-party strength and state organization would be crucial. Because it appointed the all powerful Democratic State Executive Committee and virtually chose the officers of state government, the state convention held the key to dominance. Therefore, the selection of convention delegates was vitally important to any faction seeking to capture the party. While county conventions or primaries could be used, and conventions were the usual formula, each county executive committee had the right to determine the method for picking a county delegation to the state convention. Also, beats (precints) held either local meetings or beat primaries to select delegates to the county conventions. Once it was in the state convention, a county delegation's size determined the measure of its influence. Because there were no black delegates and the number of a county's white delegates was apportioned on the basis of the last Democratic vote for governor, black-belt counties received inordinate power in the convention. For example, Dallas County — with 9,285 whites and 45,372 Negroes — returned a Democratic gubernatorial vote of about 9,000 in 1888 and received 30 delegates, while Cherokee County — with 18,080 whites and 3,618 Negroes — had a vote of nearly 3,000 and got only 10 delegates. Twice as many whites in Cherokee possessed only one-third the delegate strength of Dallas County whites.³⁵

The resulting control of black-belt politicians over the party machinery, and their use of the Negro to preserve that power, produced the seeds of sectional splits within the Democracy. In 1889, Democratic papers, in largely white areas, demanded that representation in the 1890 convention be based solely on the white voters in a county. This seemed reasonable to those publications since only whites were allowed to vote in the primaries and to take part in the selection of convention delegates. The Bourbons, however, resisted any efforts to alter

³⁴Murray S. Stedman and Susan W. Stedman, *Discontent at The Polls: A Study of Farmer and Labor Parties, 1827-1948* (New York, 1950), 78, 80; Washington Gladden, "The Embattled Farmers," *Forum*, X (November, 1890), 315-316, 319, 321-322; *Montgomery Advertiser*, August 9, 1890.

³⁵Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 101-102, 98.

the procedure for selecting delegates. In fact, the *Advertiser* — while admitting that white counties would be under-represented in 1890 — called for settling the question by determining a county's delegation in the future on the basis of full population. Clouding the issue, the *Advertiser* said the black-belt should not be penalized because of the unfortunate presence of a large Negro population. Since Negroes would have served still as the source of black-belt dominance, the *Advertiser* was trying only to smooth over the conflict by proposing a solution that offered no real changes and by creating racial sympathy for the black-belt. To the profound dissatisfaction of the predominantly white counties, the situation remained unaltered, thereby leaving sectional animosity alive.³⁶

With tension mounting throughout the state, discussion turned to the approaching gubernatorial race. As yet, Kolb had been the only candidate to announce, but opposition to him soon became manifest. By January 1890, three of the four leading Democratic daily newspapers — the *Montgomery Advertiser*, the *Mobile Register*, and the *Birmingham News* — expressed their antipathy to Kolb. Only one of the leaders, the *Birmingham Age-Herald*, refused to declare against the commissioner. The *Age-Herald*, while criticizing the *Advertiser* for its stand against Kolb, straddled the issue of an endorsement and pushed for cooperation with the agrarians to bring political harmony. At the same time, Kolb claimed he had the backing of the state's newspapers.³⁷ Actually, most papers, as yet, had not assumed a definite position on a candidate; but they had opposed the St. Louis Demands, and conservative opinion was coalescing against Kolb and the agrarian political involvement.

As that opinion hardened, the position of Kolb and the Alliance in relation to the St. Louis Demands became a controlling factor in Bourbon arguments. Despite Kolb's statement denying that he had supported the Demands, the conservatives succeeded in linking him to them, thereby forcing him to defend them — to an extent. Bourbon opposition, however,

³⁶See: *Birmingham Age-Herald*, April 3, 1889, and *Montgomery Advertiser*, March 19, 20, 1889. Criticism had been hurled at the black-belt counties for their control of Negro votes ever since the restoration of white rule. See: Going, *Bourbon Democracy*, 33-42.

³⁷*Birmingham Age-Herald*, January 1, 29, 1890.

stemmed less from the nature of the Demands than from opposition to their source. With the Alliance threatening their dominance, the Bourbons attacked wherever they could. But fearing the political repercussions of a direct onslaught, they rushed toward the most vulnerable points. To the conservatives this meant the Alliance political activities. Kolb was attacked as the epitome of those actions. As the Bourbons carefully explained: opposition to Kolb had no implications of a stand against the brotherhood; rather, it was necessary to preserve cherished party solidarity.³⁸

Soon conservative reactions to Kolb and the Alliance became more pointed. There were reasons for this: the Bourbons, understandably, feared the basis of Kolb's strength — the distressed farmers — and realized the breadth of his appeal; moreover, his association with reform programs and pressure groups threatened the established party machinery. New faces entering the structure would leave less room for established politicians. In addition, the very foundations of Bourbon black-belt power were under attack. As the conservatives realized these things, they tightened their ranks and swore to defeat the common enemy. Their opposition became stronger and new tactics were used.³⁹

In order to draw support from Kolb, the Bourbons put out a large field of gubernatorial candidates from different areas of the state. The nature of Alabama politics made this a clever maneuver, since local candidates drew very heavy local support in most elections. By this method, the conservatives hoped to gather enough delegates pledged to their candidates to control the 1890 state convention.⁴⁰ Toward this purpose,

³⁸Thomas Goode Jones, "The 1890-92 Campaigns for Governor of Alabama," *Montgomery Advertiser*, September 17, 1911, reprinted in *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XX (1958), 662; *Mobile Register*, March 13, 1890; *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, March 6, May 1, 1890, citing *Mobile Register*; *Tuscaloosa Times*, May 7, 1890.

³⁹Senator John T. Morgan to Robert McKee, May 24, 1890, Robert McKee Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery; Thomas Goode Jones to John Dale, January 8, 1889, Official Correspondence of Governor Thomas Goode Jones (hereinafter cited as Jones Papers), Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery. See: Sheldon Hackney, *Populism to Progressivism in Alabama* (Princeton, N. J., 1969), 10.

⁴⁰Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 98. See: V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), 37.

the *Advertiser* put up, among others, Thomas Goode Jones of Montgomery and "Honest Jim" Crook, a Calhoun County farmer-politician who had been the agrarian spokesman on the original Alabama Railroad Commission.⁴¹ Heading the long list of other possible mentioned by the Bourbons were a number of prominent Democrats from all regions of the state: Joseph F. Johnston, Birmingham banker; Probate Judge William Richardson, Huntsville; H. D. Davidson, Perry County planter; and Congressman William C. Oates, Henry County.⁴²

Seeking to capitalize on their representations of the Kolb-Alliance threat to Democratic solidarity, the Bourbons also injected strong emotional issue into the campaign. Kolb was charged with purposefully disrupting the party, thereby endangering white rule. The *Advertiser*, convinced of the truth of this allegation, criticized him daily and predicted his defeat. Criticism of the Alliance centered on its association with Negro local alliances and the execrable menaces that that engendered. Furthermore, conservatives said the Negroes were reacting as expected to the billowing factionalism among whites. Instances supposed to reveal increasing black insolence to white women and lack of the proper docility among Negroes received wide press coverage. To some Democratic editors, the dark spectre of Negro participation in politics seemed to be looming across the skies. All the myths of black reconstruction were added to the growing atmosphere of aroused racism. And Bourbon newspapers, showing the state's voters they stood on the side of white supremacy, reiterated the role of the Democracy in restoring white rule and reminded the Negro of his place in Alabama society, while lecturing him on his inability to participate intelligently in politics, and warning him of the dangerous ground upon which he tread.⁴³

Commissioner Kolb soon reacted to the conservative re-

⁴¹Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 6, 1890, citing Montgomery *Advertiser*; Allen J. Going, "The Establishment of the Alabama Railroad Commission," *Journal of Southern History*, XII (1946), 378.

⁴²Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 381-382.

⁴³Thomas Goode Jones to John Dale, January 8, 1889, Jones Papers; Montgomery *Advertiser*, January, 1890, *passim*; Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, May 29, 1, 1890. The Democratic editor of the *Gazette* pointed out that one Negro so adamantly resisted ejection from a railroad car reserved for whites that his eyeglasses had to be smashed in order to make him more cooperative. See: Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, May 1, 1890.

sistance. Previously, he had expressed his loyalty to the Democracy and to white supremacy, and he had sought to avoid connection with the St. Louis Demands. But incessant Bourbon attacks forced him to defend the Alliance ideals in a broad manner. Therefore, he adhered consistently to the principles of the brotherhood, but refused to campaign on the basis of the Demands. Kolb in fact, was giving his position a vagueness probably needed in Alabama. To help accomplish that objective, he gave a simplified explanation of the Alliance goals that was meant to appeal to the sense of disadvantage among the agrarians. After calling for Alliance support, while using his farmers' institutes more widely now for political purposes, the commissioner proclaimed that farmers should band together behind his leadership to promote their interests. Finally, in an effort to give his campaign a central theme, Kolb exhorted the people of Alabama to rise up and cast off the Bourbon machine.⁴⁴

Faced by growing press opposition, Kolb criticized the Bourbon newspapers and called into question the motives of their conservative editors. Following Kolb's lead, S. M. Adams, while making it clear he was and would remain a loyal Democrat, declared an Alliance boycott of Bourbon papers, and sharply denounced the *Advertiser*, saying it was printing a wide assortment of lies in an effort to destroy the brotherhood. Adams' boycott failed to affect the *Advertiser*, and most other established papers, but it did create problems for many hard-pressed smaller conservative organs. On the negative side, it served to weld the Bourbons together, causing them to redouble their resistance. At the same time, papers endorsing Kolb and supporting the Alliance received intensive economic pressure: businessmen withdrew advertising; banks called in loans and foreclosed mortgages. Consequently, many Alliance organs failed, while others soon reversed their former stance and opposed Kolb.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Montgomery *Advertiser*, February 13, August 16, 1890; Clark *Populism in Alabama*, 99.

⁴⁵Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 16, January 16, February 6, 1890; Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, November 6, August 14, 1890. On February 2, 1890, the Montgomery *Alliance-Herald*, the largest newspaper supporting Kolb, fell under a levy due to financial difficulties. The Alliance Exchange, however, paid its debts and continued publishing. See: Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 6, 1890.

By spring there were five announced candidates for the Democratic nomination. Besides Kolb, Thomas G. Jones, Joseph F. Johnston, William Richardson, and James Crook had thrown their hats into the ring.⁴⁶ The *Advertiser* leaned gradually toward open support of Jones, calling his party loyalty unimpeachable and praising his conservative stance. But it carefully avoided polarizing the Bourbon forces by finding all candidates — except Kolb — to be acceptable.⁴⁷

Jones epitomized Bourbon sentiment. He gave sympathy to the proposals of the Alliance and approved the right of farmers to organize. Yet he adamantly opposed the Alliance entry into Alabama politics, maintaining that the farmers should seek redress for grievances from the established party machinery. Jones's position is understandable, for he had been seeking the nomination for years through the properly constituted Democratic hierarchy, and he did not wish to see that hierarchy destroyed. He pointed out that the agrarians had no reason for challenging the Democracy, for the party, he said, held their interests close to heart. Why else had the Democrats established the railroad commission and lowered taxes? Jones, in referring to the St. Louis Demands, opposed the subtreasury as an unconstitutional measure designed to benefit speculators. He apparently vacillated on the money issue, giving some favor to both free silver and tariff reform as methods of solving the money question.⁴⁸

With the selection of delegates to the state convention soon to begin, the Bourbon press increased its attacks on Kolb. After groping for a way to denounce the commissioner without rending the party more than already had been done, the conservatives finally resorted to vicious personal assaults, thereby excluding discussion of other issues.⁴⁹ Vitriol was a non-economic, non-ideological verjuice they could pour on as thickly as possible.

⁴⁶Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, April 3, 1890.

⁴⁷Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 381.

⁴⁸Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, May 29, 1890; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 99-100. See: Carolyn R. Huggins, "Bourbonism and Radicalism in Alabama: The Gubernatorial Administration of Thomas Goode Jones, 1890-1894" (M.A. thesis, Auburn University, 1968).

⁴⁹Most Alabama Democratic newspapers seldom gave more than superficial opinions on political questions. And after the personal charges against Kolb were introduced, they dominated political discussions appearing in the Bourbon press.

Because he had not resigned his office before opening his campaign (contrary to Democratic party customs), Kolb was labeled as a self-seeking politician. His administration was condemned as wholly political, critical references to his use of the farmers' institute were made, and questions arose in regard to his personal honesty. Democratic charges, which were based upon letters and sworn statements printed in Bourbon newspapers, held that the commissioner had committed fraud in a real-estate transaction twenty-five years earlier, and created enough talk to force an explanation.⁵⁰ Although he related the details of the transaction and satisfactorily maintained his innocence of any wrongdoing in an open letter, Kolb's statement was called "a lengthy document . . . made up wholly of denials unsupported by proof."⁵¹ On the basis of his refuted clarification, the *Register* branded Kolb a "self-confessed criminal."⁵² One Democratic paper expressed its conviction of his "want of fitness for the exalted position of Governor of Alabama."⁵³ But a far more damaging accusation dealt with Kolb's use of free passes on the state's railroads. When this information came to light, Bourbon papers throughout the state carried detailed stories revealing how Kolb had travelled for free but had charged the state for his expenses.⁵⁴ And as the campaign entered its final stages, conservative obloquy reached the point of absurdity: Kolb was accused of not paying the rent on

⁵⁰Montgomery *Advertiser*, August 16, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, March 12, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, April 3, March 13, 1890.

⁵¹Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 27, 1890.

⁵²Mobile *Register*, March 16, 1890.

⁵³Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 13, 1890.

⁵⁴Mobile *Register*, March 11, 16, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 20, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, March 5, 12, April 2, May 7, 1890. Kolb issued the following statement:

I have had passes on several of the railroads of Alabama, on some of them before I was commissioner of agriculture. I have had these passes since I have been commissioner. When I have been on my individual business, I have used the passes. When on business for the department, I have paid the fare. I have not felt that I ought to use railroad passes in my official capacity.

Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 6, 1890, citing Birmingham *Age-Herald*. Kolb was being condemned for a practice that was not unusual at the time. Furthermore, at least one of his opponents, Thomas Goode Jones, held a railroad pass in the future. See: James F. Doster, *Railroads in Alabama Politics, 1874-1914* (University, Ala., 1951), 37-38.

his watermelon patch.⁵⁵ Finally, the *Register* pictured him as a merchant posing as a farmer to attract votes and found him to be "the veriest demagogue that ever bowed before an audience; reckless of his promises, treacherous to the honest principles of his party and aiming at success with any weapon convenient to his reach."⁵⁶

Brought to a fevered state by the heat of their incessant revilement, the conservatives declared Kolb politically dead. The effects of their brickbatting, however, proved far less favorable than they could have foreseen. Kolb generally ignored the Bourbon attacks and left his defense to his followers, many of whom refused even to read or to hear the accusations.⁵⁷ The commissioner, himself, preferred to remind the voters of increasing receipts, from various sources, to the agriculture department and of the economy practiced under his administration. Following Kolb's lead, a zealot writing as "Farmer" judged:

His office is to-day of more financial and practical benefit to the people of this state, (and) brings more money back for that expended than any other in the gift of the people.⁵⁸

Kolb partisans also defended his integrity by saying it would be difficult to find anyone in politics who had no stains on his record. One supporter found it curious that twenty-five-year-old crimes should be discovered by Kolb's enemies in an election year. He pointed out that the misdeeds surely had been known to the critics before, and that the same men had praised Kolb since the crimes were supposed to have been committed.⁵⁹ Many sympathizers reacted more emotionally, calling the charges lies spawned by Bourbon greed and determination

⁵⁵Tuscaloosa *Times*, May 14, 1890. Kolb was pictured as a ruthless business cheat by the *Mobile Register*. See: *Mobile Register*, May 10, 22, 1890. The *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, May 15, 1890, accused Kolb of opposing the Alliance!

⁵⁶*Mobile Register*, May 23, 1890.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, May 10, 1890. Kolb's partisans did counter with some charges, many against Johnston, but they were ignored by the Democratic press. See: *Montgomery Advertiser*, April 18, 1890.

⁵⁸*Tuscaloosa Gazette*, April 3, 1890. See: *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, February 6, May 15, 1890.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, March 20, 1890. The *Gazette* cited the *Atlanta (Georgia) Constitution* as authority that Kolb had lost strength due to the numerous charges.

to crush the Alliance.⁶⁰ To many of Kolb's supporters he became a martyr suffering blows aimed by the Bourbon enemy at the beloved brotherhood. As a result, the Democracy was strongly polarized into two camps — Bourbons and "Kolbites."

Against a background of sweltering partisanship, delegates were chosen to the crucial Democratic State Convention. Bitter divisions produced split local conventions and contesting delegations, but a clear pattern of strength for each candidate developed. All the antagonists gained support in the proximity of their residences. Kolb took Barbour County, his recent home, in a convention marked by violence, and, with the exception of Johnston, was the only candidate revealing statewide appeal. His delegate-count included men from northern hill counties, central and southern counties, and the black-belt. Johnston carried Dallas — his former residence — in a primary, and Jefferson by the same method. Richardson won his home county (Madison) and gained backing in other rural, northern hill counties, including Blount. While also dominating his home delegation (Calhoun), Crook picked up additional support in north central Alabama. And Montgomery county, following the pattern, pledged for Jones.⁶¹

By convention time, in late May, Kolb reportedly controlled 215 delegates, about 50 shy of a majority, while Johnston, Kolb's nearest rival, was credited with 100. The remaining delegates were divided among Richardson (87), Crook (53), and Jones (50).⁶² With 264 votes necessary for the nomination, the Bourbons controlled enough delegates to dominate the convention; and they were drawn tightly together in their desire to dominate that body in order to resist Kolb and the Alliance. Moreover, the Democratic State Executive Committee was anti-Kolb. Even the entire Alabama congressional delegation opposed Kolb and feared the political threat of the Alliance. In

⁶⁰Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 6, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, May 14, 1890. The Montgomery *Advertiser* predicted that Kolb would pose as a martyr. See: Tuscaloosa *Times*, May 21, 1890, citing Montgomery *Advertiser*.

⁶¹Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 98-99.

⁶²Montgomery *Advertiser*, May 25, 1890. The Birmingham *News*, May 8, 1890, reported the totals as Kolb (82½), Johnston (63½), Richardson (40), Crook (32), Jones (30).

fact, the total Bourbon machine was poised against the agrarians and their champion.⁶³

As the delegates began collecting in Montgomery, it was apparent that the 1890 Democratic State Convention would differ from recent conventions. For farmers comprised a majority of the delegates. But the old line politicians were present in full force. In view of the inexperience of most of the farmers in politics, and the intransigent antagonism of the entrenched, battle-tested Bourbons, it was unlikely that the agrarians could dominate the proceedings.⁶⁴

Kolb, nevertheless, called a caucus of his supporters in order to fuse them together and to prepare strategy for the convention. Meeting in the Montgomery County Courthouse May 29, the night before the convention balloting was to begin, 242 sympathizers heard rousing speeches espousing traditional Democratic ideals and proclaiming Kolb as the man best suited to be the next governor. Among others, H. D. Clayton, Kolb's campaign manager, and Kolb, himself, presented the virtues of the commissioner. A resolution was offered, but rejected, that would have pledged the delegates to iron-clad support of Kolb at all costs. Finally, it was agreed that they would just "stick by" Kolb.⁶⁵

When the convention convened, Bourbon control was quickly implemented. A firm Kolb opponent, H. C. Tompkins, Chairman of the Democratic State Executive Committee and a director of the Bank of Montgomery, called the delegates to order and appointed W. H. Denson — a Crook supporter — temporary chairman. A credentials committee was then named to rule on the seating of contesting delegations from Shelby, Lee, and Chilton counties. The convention soon adopted reports on the contesting delegations that were unfavorable to Kolb's forces, thereby revealing the presence of a clear-cut majority of anti-Kolb delegates.⁶⁶

⁶³Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 103-104.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, June 5, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 4, 1890; Montgomery *Advertiser*, May 24, 1890. Kolb feared a combination of the Bourbons against him.

⁶⁶Birmingham *News*, May 28, 1890; Montgomery *Advertiser*, March 20, 1889, May 30, 1890.

As the balloting began, the strength of each candidate became apparent. The first tally showed Kolb with 235 votes, Johnston with 104, Richardson 88, Crook 53, and Jones 45. After two days of voting and thirty-eight ballots, Kolb's total had not climbed past 241, with only minor changes in the rest of the field. Following adjournment on the second day, Johnston's managers called for a conference between representatives of the Bourbon forces to find a way to stop Kolb.⁸⁷

Bourbon managers, meeting in an all-night session, sought to merge their aggregate vote behind an agreeable candidate. Johnston, of course, controlled the most delegates, but one fact made his nomination impossible. Jones's Montgomery County delegates were pledged to Kolb as a second choice; and if Jones were withdrawn their votes would push the commissioner over the top. Johnston and the other conservative candidates could hold their delegates and deliver them to Jones, if necessary. Jones's seeming weakness, and the strength of Bourbon determination to defeat Kolb, produced conservative coalescence behind Jones.⁸⁸

The following morning Johnston, Richardson, and Crook withdrew from the race, leaving only Kolb and Jones. On the next ballot Jones was nominated, receiving 277 votes to Kolb's 245. Before announcement of the results, however, H. D. Clayton withdrew Kolb's name and moved that Jones's nomination be made unanimous — as was done. In his acceptance speech, Jones called for Democratic solidarity to preserve home rule, white supremacy, and prosperity. Kolb followed, pledging his loyalty to the Democracy, and to its principles, and

⁸⁷Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 4, 1890; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 105-108. Kolb was feverishly trying to trade votes with candidates for lesser offices in order to put himself over the total needed for nomination. See: *Montgomery Advertiser*, May 31, 1890.

⁸⁸Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 35; J. L. Sheffield to O. D. Street, June 2, 1890, O. D. Street Papers, Amelia Gayle Gorgas Library, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. Sheffield wrote of the convention:

While I was no Kolb man, I think he was defeated by unjust rulings by the chairman, every stratigy [*sic*] and device that could be thought of was resorted to. I heard great mutterings among the Kolb men. Some said they did not consider it anything but a mob, and would not support Jones.

promising to stump the state for Jones in the forthcoming state elections.⁶⁹

As the Democrats smoothed over their differences, their normal opponents, the Republicans, gathered in convention in the same city. After calling the assembly to order, Dr. Robert A. Moseley, Jr., Chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee, delivered the keynote address. Denouncing Democratic frauds, he said they kept the Republicans from assuming their legitimate position as the dominant party in Alabama. He called for a free ballot and a fair count — a cry that would be heard increasingly in the years to come — and endorsed the ideal of a protective tariff. After Noble Smithson of Birmingham was found ineligible, Benjamin M. Long of Walker County became the Republican candidate for governor.⁷⁰

By 1889, fusion with independent groups and the rise of industry had increased Republican numbers in North Alabama. Also contributing to party growth was the national Republican policy which favored cooperation between state Republican parties and independent parties in the South. The same policy, however, also called for recognition of lily-white factions within the party. In Alabama, Republicans received black votes but failed to give Negroes a fair share of patronage and political recognition. The rise of a lily-white faction and the effects of discrimination spawned a rift between black and white in the Alabama Republican party.⁷¹

A group of state Republican leaders, who were not out of step with national party policies, developed a movement to oust the Negroes from the party and to cooperate with independents. Meeting under their leadership in Birmingham in April 1889, a large contingent of the party formed the White

⁶⁹Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 4, 1890; Mobile *Register*, June 1, 1890. The Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, June 5, 1890, proudly announced that the opposition of the press had brought about Kolb's defeat.

⁷⁰Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 11, 18, 1890. The remnants of the Alabama Greenback party held a convention in July and nominated Judge L. C. Goulson of Jackson County for governor. See: Montgomery *Advertiser*, July 8, 1890. The insignificant Alabama Prohibition party cancelled plans for a convention. See: Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 11, 1890.

⁷¹Allen J. Going, "Critical Months in Alabama Politics, 1895-96," *Alabama Review*, V (October, 1952), 271-272, and *Bourbon Democracy*, 49-54; Vincent P. DeSantis, "The Republican Party and the Southern Negro, 1877-1897," *Journal of Negro History*, XLV (April, 1960), 71-72.

Republican Tariff League. Negro Republicans met simultaneously and declared that they would resist and, ultimately, prevent expulsion. Robert A. Moseley, the former Talladega postmaster who headed another faction that favored retention of the Negroes, defied the Lily-Whites, joined the Negro assembly, and formed a coalition of Black-and-Tans. Since his group represented the majority of Alabama Republicans, Moseley soon became state boss of the party.⁷²

However, there remained a great deal of suspicion among the blacks of Moseley's motives; and by 1890, some Negroes were openly accusing Moseley of using their votes, and of failing to dole out the desired patronage. They announced that they would support Kolb, on the basis of the St. Louis Demands and his opposition to the Bourbons, if the Republicans did not put out a ticket.⁷³ Moseley managed, for the time being, to preserve his power and to keep his coalition alive by allowing a Republican slate to be drawn up in 1890 and by refusing to accept the offer of merger that was tendered by the remnants of the Alabama Greenback party. But the condition of the party still remained uncertain due to the presence of the Lily-Whites. In fact, one historian, speaking of the period before the 1890 elections, has said:

two Republican parties existed in Alabama, one relying on the Negro vote and the other anxious to divorce itself from Negro support and to co-operate with whatever dissatisfied white groups might wage political war on Democracy.⁷⁴

Because the Republicans were suffering from internal strife, the Democrats could have expected an easy victory, and they might have chosen to conduct a relaxed campaign, if 1890 had not been also a year of Democratic internal difficulties. The very existence of their differences made the Democrats eager to put up a united front in a strong campaign against the Republicans. To show their unity, the Democrats opened their 1890 campaign in Eufaula—Kolb's former home. W. H. Denison, temporary chairman of the recent state convention, while setting the issues in a lengthy and repetitious tirade against the Republicans, said:

⁷²Going, "Critical Months," 271; Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 50.

⁷³Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, May 29, 1890. Moseley did appoint some Negroes to minor offices. See: Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, April 24, 1890, citing Eutaw *Mirror*.

⁷⁴Going, *Bourbon Democracy*, 54.

NO MATTER WHAT ORGANIZATION YOU BELONG TO, YOU OWE AN ALLEGIANCE TO THE DEMOCRACY OF THE SOUTH. THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST US ARE TRAITORS TO OUR INSTITUTIONS AND OUR RELIGION. LONG AND THE NIGGERS ARE TRAITORS TO OUR WIVES AND DAUGHTERS. THE MAN WHO VOTES FOR BEN LONG IS A TRAITOR, A SCOUNDREL AND AN OUTLAW AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF OUR SOCIETY AND AGAINST THE GOD WHO GAVE HIM LIFE.⁷⁵

True to his convention pledge, Kolb endorsed the party nominees and travelled across the state making speeches in favor of Jones, for which he received the praise of most of the Democratic press. However, the *Mobile Register*, still permeated by the heat of months past, warned that Kolb's actions stemmed only from political expediency.⁷⁶

While Alliance candidates appeared on Democratic tickets in most areas, fourteen-cent corn and five-cent cotton, and interest rates often above ten percent, angered the farmers, who vented their wrath on the normal Democratic candidates. In many white counties, where a large Negro vote of doubtful legitimacy was not available to help them, Bourbon politicians often were cast out and agrarians placed in their stead. As the campaign progressed, local alliances adopted resolutions calling for legislation that they wanted their candidates to support. The measures advocated included some that were economic: exemption of farm implements from taxation, a maximum legal interest rate of six percent, and abolishment of the fertilizer tax. Others appeared progressive, such as increased appropriations for education, longer school terms, and the direct election of United States Senators, Railroad Commissioners, and the Commissioner of Agriculture. And others appeared unsavory or reactionary, including legal provisions for separate railroad cars

⁷⁵Birmingham *Age-Herald*, July 27, 1890.

⁷⁶Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 184-185; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 111. The Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, June 5, 1890, also refused to be conciliated. It said, "we do not think any more of Kolb now than we did before the convention. We believe he is the same man today that he was twenty years ago when he swindled old man McRea [sic] out of \$6,000."

for whites and Negroes, and a ban against running freight trains on Sundays.⁷⁷

The perspicacious Republicans, in a vain attempt to drive a wedge between the factions of the Democracy, appealed to the agrarians by endorsing the St. Louis Demands; but the results of the August elections made bare the bankruptcy of their plea. Thomas G. Jones overwhelmed his hapless opponent, accumulating 138,525 votes to 42,136 for the Republican Long.⁷⁸ The Republicans carried only Lawrence and Winston Counties, their traditional North Alabama strongholds. More significantly, although the next Legislature would be heavily Democratic, it also would be composed of a majority of Alliancemen in the House, and nearly one-third in the Senate.⁷⁹

Of course, the Democratic victory generated little surprise among political observers at the time. To the historian, however, the 1890 election is significant for the unrest displayed by the agrarians in their support of Kolb—a man called a traitor by his own party. Also significant is the excellent showing of Alliance candidates for the General Assembly.

The agrarians obviously had voted the way they did in the expectation that they would gain relief for their grievances. And the conservatives recognized the need to make some appearances of replying to the agrarian grumblings. Therefore, in his inaugural address, Governor Jones called for ballot reforms, without property or educational qualifications for voting, and advised that the convict lease system be reformed. Furthermore, he advocated better education for the masses of both races. Although his overall tone was quite conservative, and he declared the promotion of industrial prosperity to be the major task lying before his administration, Jones had infused his address with a measure of progressivism not present in recent inaugurals. And his cautious reform proposals dove-tailed nicely with his well-known position on the demands of the farmers: farmers should present their grievances to the Democracy and the party would listen. Moreover, in 1890 the Bourbons declared that they understood the needs of the Alliance

⁷⁷Shannon, *Farmers' Last Frontier*, 319; Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 185.

⁷⁸*Manuscript Election Returns, Alabama Gubernatorial Election, 1890*, Files of the Secretary of State, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

⁷⁹Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 111-112; Woodward, *Origins of the New South*, 203.

and listed them as organization among the farmers, defeat of the trusts, and procurement of equitable taxes. Of course, a Democratic party led by the Bourbons was presented as the agency through which all those needs and all other needs of the agrarians could be realized.⁸⁰

But Governor Jones and his party essentially failed to come to grips with the problem before them, for neither Jones nor his Democracy had the capability to react properly to fundamentally economic issues. For controlled as they were by laissez faire philosophy, they could not espouse governmental remedies for agricultural distress. The conservatives, therefore, offered the agrarians only strained sympathy, faulty understanding of their needs and goals, and the restrained reforms found in Jones's inaugural. The Bourbons, chained to a policy of party unity that bound them to avoid divisive issues, were forced to resist broad-based political movements that were rooted in discontent and based on new, magnetic ideas.

Conservative thought, viewed as the correct thought by its adherents, assumed that there would be no wide-spread challenge to the established system, and quite naturally, offered no alternatives to that system. Dedicated as they were to industrial progress, the Bourbons could not and refused to acknowledge the friction against their outlook created by the drag of agricultural deterioration in Alabama. Jones and the conservatives, moreover, derived additional cause for promoting industrial progress *from* agricultural distress. They assumed that agricultural prosperity would follow in the wake of business prosperity and, therefore, called for the farmers to follow them in the quest for progress.⁸¹

The agrarians, however, were involved in a crusade of their own making. To them agricultural prosperity heralded all other good times, so the basic assumption of their thought was antithetical to that of the conservatives. The result was that the agrarians could not be led by the Bourbons; nor could the conservatives follow the agrarians.

⁸⁰Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, December 4, 1890; Joseph R. Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan* (Chicago, 1963), 8.

⁸¹Hugh Charles Davis, "An Analysis of the Rationale of Representative Conservative Alabamians, 1874-1914" (Ph. D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1964), 252-256.

In Alabama, the white man's Democracy was the parent of both the Bourbon and the agrarian outlooks. Because the two viewpoints were crowded together within the same party structure, they could remain together either so long as the appeals of tradition and of white supremacy allowed that structure to be expanded to include both strains of thought or until the increasing agrarian numbers cramped the edifice to the point of collapse. In 1890, and again in 1892, the Bourbon leadership refused to permit expansion of the top-level party structure to include agrarian leaders such as Kolb. But by 1892 the agrarian contingent had grown too large, and had experienced success too great and even failure too close, while their leaders had developed ambitions too strong, for the group any longer to suffer the constraints of the conservatives. Therefore, they collected the baggage reminiscent of their common heritage with the Bourbons and, with it in tow, separated themselves from the untenable union. The initial step toward that schism occurred in 1890 when the Alliance entered its large, dissatisfied agrarian following in the lists of Alabama politics.

BOOK REVIEWS

Edward K. Eckert. *The Navy Department in the War of 1812*. University of Florida Social Sciences Monograph Number 48. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1973. Pp. vii, 77. \$2.00.)

Studies of the administration of the United States Navy Department during the early decades of its existence have been few, so few that the standard work remains Charles Oscar Paullin's series of articles published in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* early in the twentieth century. Thus the appearance of a monograph dealing specifically with the Navy Department in the War of 1812 should be pleasing to students of United States naval history and to those interested in the early republic.

Eckert's work, written originally as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Florida, is based on official records and secondary materials. Most important, he was able to use the personal papers of William Jones, now held by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Indeed, the dissertation was entitled "William Jones and the Role of the Secretary of the Navy in the War of 1812," and that title, cumbersome as it is, states succinctly the content of this monograph.

Briefly, Eckert contends that the Navy Department had developed haphazardly since its establishment in 1798, particularly during the period 1801-1812 when Robert Smith and Paul Hamilton were secretaries. The latter, who drank heavily, allowed affairs to lapse into a chaotic state even as warships of the United States Navy were winning their principal victories at sea. At the end of 1812, President James Madison received the resignations of the secretaries of war and the navy—Eckert does not explore the question of whether the resignations were requested—and quickly offered the latter position to William Jones, a Philadelphia merchant and sometime master mariner and congressman who had declined Thomas Jefferson's offer of the Navy Department in 1801. After a few days of thought, Jones accepted and became an effective secretary of the navy although hampered by the highly inefficient organization of his Department, which he was powerless to change during the course of the war.

To prove his point, Eckert considers Jones' performance in the areas of strategy, personnel, and materiels. The first is summed up by the statement that the secretary was an administrator, not a strategist—he found the means to carry out the President's strategic policies. Jones was more impressive in his dealings with the naval commanders, many of whom had been acting almost independent of any direction. He required careful accounting of expenditures and demanded that their activities be fully reported. With regard to materiel he took a keen interest in the design and fitting out of new warships, curbing the tendencies of the individual commanders to rig their ships according to their own ideas.

William Jones emerges from this monograph with an enhanced reputation, but a thorough study of the Navy Department in the War of 1812 has yet to be written. If Eckert can bring himself to make the Department itself rather than a single secretary the subject of his research, he may write this work. Until that time, we must continue to rely on Paullin.

Robert Erwin Johnson
University of Alabama

The Kemper County Rebel: The Civil War Diary of Robert Masten Holmes, C.S.A. Edited by Frank Allen Dennis with a foreword by Thomas L. Connelly. (University, Miss.: The University and College Press of Mississippi, 1973, Pr. XIX, 115. \$4.95.)

The Kemper County Rebel is yet another of those Civil War diaries covering a brief period of the conflict. This work is the diary of Robert Masten Holmes, C.S.A. and covers the short period from November, 1862, through May, 1863. During this six-month period Holmes was a private in the Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg, following its retirement to middle Tennessee from the Kentucky campaign of 1862.

The volume is beautifully edited by Professor Allen Dennis of Cleveland, Mississippi. Mr. Dennis admits in the beginning that the diary sheds no new light on the history of the Army of Tennessee, but he defends the value of the publication as a worthy primary source written contemporaneous. Also he argues that it will prove to the Neo-Confederates that the Civil

War was not "some sort of valorous game free from sorrow and hardship. . . ." To this reviewer a better defense might be its geneological value. The editor has carefully shown numerous kinships in addition to an historical sketch of the Holmes family and Robert Holmes in particular. To those whose ancestors may have served in the area described the volume should have particular value.

Much as is true of other Civil War diaries of the foot soldier, this diarist spends much of his time in discussing the weather. To one who, as I have, has spent several years as a resident of middle Tennessee, the descriptions of the sudden changes, the bitter cold, and rain were very real. For one with only a blanket or tent as cover, weather was obviously uppermost in his thoughts.

It is surprising that Holmes' diary does not reflect more strongly the growing discontent in the Army of Tennessee. There was increasing criticism of General Bragg and expressions of the lack of confidence in him. This was particularly true after his retreat from Kentucky and ever more so after his failure to win a clear victory at the battle of Murfreesboro. This growing lack of confidence is duly recorded in other diaries of the foot soldier of the period. Holmes does appear to have been something of a model soldier, however, in that his complaints were kept to a minimum. Perhaps a critical comment on his superiors was unthinkable.

The excellent editing of Dennis is clearly evident in the thorough research and documentation found in the preface and the extensive footnotes. Mr. Thomas L. Connelly of the University of South Carolina has written a very appropriate foreword which adds much to the volume. An appendix and good index add value and utility to the publication. The publishers have produced an attractive and beautifully bound little book for the ever-growing collection of Civil War source material.

Gordon T. Chappell
Huntingdon College

Joseph E. Brown and the Politics of Reconstruction. By Derrell C. Roberts. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1973, Pp. 166. \$6.00.)

Joseph E. Brown and the Politics of Reconstruction is a brief biography of one of Georgia's most famous governors, one who was able to accomodate himself to the swiftly changing times of the 1860's and 1870's. Indeed, he was a political chameleon: a secessionist Democrat in 1860, a states' rights Confederate in 1861, a Johnson Unionist in 1865, a scalawag Republican in 1868, A Liberal Republican in 1872, a Bourbon Democrat in 1876.

Professor Roberts, dean of Kennesaw Mountain Junior College in Marietta, Georgia, surveys Brown's entire life and concentrates on his Reconstruction career. This study finds that Brown's antebellum career as a Georgia legislator and governor foreshadowed his narrow states' rights stance during the Civil War and his interest in education and railroad development during Reconstruction. After a four-year tug-of-war with Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government, Brown accepted the Confederacy's collapse and was conciliatory toward the federal government. While active in Georgia's post-war economic development, he increasingly supported Republican Reconstruction, and the author believes that this support arose from his concern about his substantial investments in Georgia real estate. Brown often spoke of a new era for the South and urged that Northern men and money be welcomed. In early 1868 Brown openly joined the Republicans, but his political activities continued generally to be behind the scenes. His only significant office as a Republican was that of chief justice of the Georgia Supreme Court. By 1874 he began to move toward the Democratic party, and in 1876 he was dispatched to Florida to help unravel the dispute over the electoral vote of that state. This activity cemented his position in the good graces of Georgia Democrats, and his revived popularity ultimately won him a seat in the U.S. Senate, 1880-1890.

Brown's career illustrates the familiar stereotype of the opportunistic Southerner who joined the Republicans when Democratic prospects were dim, only to flee the Republican ship when it began to sink. His career also contradicts the familiar stereotype of the scalawag as the trashy, poor white farmer, devoid of political experience prior to Reconstruction.

Professor Roberts has used extensive primary sources for the study, especially voluminous manuscript collections. These

are cited in his footnotes which his economical publisher has placed at the back of the book. Also included is a useful appendix listing Georgia governors and U.S. Senators and Representatives.

This study is a brief factual account of Brown's economic and political careers. Unfortunately, one leaves the book acquainted with his career but not the man, as there is little here to explain what made Brown tick or why he was a political chameleon. The study would also be improved with more information on the position of scalawags in the Georgia Republican party. Such material would provide some frame of reference for evaluation of the activities of Brown.

Joseph E. Brown and the Politics of Reconstruction is particularly valuable since the only other full-length biography of Brown focused on him as a states' rights Confederate. Professor Roberts' study of a scalawag who as also a highly successful businessman provides a new dimension to our knowledge of Brown and supplies another piece of the puzzling picture of Reconstruction history.

Sarah Woolfolk Wiggins
University of Alabama

Churches in Cultural Captivity: A History of the Social Attitudes of Southern Baptists. By John Lee Eighmy with an Introduction and Epilogue by Samuel S. Hill, Jr. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1972. Pp. xvii, 249. \$11.50.)

[The title of the late Professor Eighmy's book accurately conveys the theme he develops. Several years of research and an easy flowing narrative devoid of narrow denominational concepts and ecclesiastical jargon mark his survey of Baptist responsiveness (or lack of it) to social issues from colonial times to the present. He argues well that Southern Baptists have been bound to their conservative orthodox regional culture since 1845, although he claims that the social gospel destroyed Baptists' uniform defense of "a cultural establishment" and promoted a growing tradition of social concern as to war, the economic order, and race relations. Because the evangelical tradition has remained dominant in Southern Baptist life,

Eighmy must deal with the minority of Baptists who have developed social concern. In short, the author tells the story of how Southern Baptists have lagged, not led, in social Christianity. His work in itself represents a growing if belated interest among Baptists in the social gospel.

Eighmy finds that Southern Baptists' defense of slavery, their "tragic" interpretation of Reconstruction, and their commitment to Bourbon regimes fixed regional cultural values in Baptist policy in the nineteenth century. He does, however, consistently present the views of dissenters within the Baptist establishment.

The social gospel did come South at the turn of the century as part of the progressive movement, although "long-standing problems of illiteracy, farm tenancy, and racial injustice were in themselves sufficient cause for an aroused social conscience." Only a few Baptist clergymen and laymen were caught up in social Christianity, however, and Southern Baptists never produced an Edgar Gardner Murphy nor an Alexander McKeleway. Eighmy concludes that in the light of Baptist "religious individualism, theological conservatism, decentralized authority, and denominational isolationism" it is remarkable that the social gospel influenced Southern Baptists at all. It did in the prohibition crusade, the introduction of Christian sociology courses at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, and the founding of the Social Service Commission (1911). Southern Baptists accepted liberal commission report on occasion, but never implemented them. The founding of such an agency, however, "even with its shortcomings, marked a growing feeling among Southern Baptists that serious attention must be given to their social responsibilities." The traditions of personal evangelism and collective action continued their "coexistence . . . in denominational life [and] produced varied and sometimes contradictory responses in the social issues of the twentieth century."

Eighmy describes the Social Service Commission throughout its history as a "noble gesture" reflecting the denomination's obsession with personal conversion rather than social Christianity. World affairs, not philosophical abstractions determined the commission's position on war and peace; it never questioned white supremacist racial values; its pro-labor stance

of the 1930s was a departure from its laissez faire norm; and it continued its dry campaign. The commission represented a "half-way covenant" with social Christianity.

From 1935 to 1945 the simplistic Baptist social ethic manifested itself most strongly in opposition to federal aid for religious institutions, seen as part of the general southern reaction to the liberalism of the later New Deal. The Joint Committee on Public Relations, including Northern, Negro, and Southern Baptists, was created to safeguard the separation of church and state. The liberal social views of its first secretary, Dr. J. M. Dawson, were obscured by the agency's singular devotion to religious liberty.

After World War II, Dr. Jesse Weatherspoon, as Secretary of the Social Service Commission, made his name as a leading Baptist statesman of the century by "outlining a working philosophy that would enable the commission to deal with controversial social problems without appearing to stray from the convention's strictly religious purposes." Such was not the case. It became apparent that in facing the dominant social issues of the 1950s and 1960s—integration, federal aid to Baptist schools, and the election of a Catholic President—the evangelical clergy and laity controlled Baptist policy. Weatherspoon recommended that the Social Service Commission (renamed the Christian Life Commission) "proceed with caution" on divisive issues.

As Professor Samuel S. Hill, Jr. of the University of Florida ably observes in the Epilogue, Eighmy's book has two thrusts: it reveals that the social gospel affected Southern Baptists very little; and from 1913 to the present the Southern Baptist Convention has "deepened its commitment to social ministries." Furthermore, the breadth of Eighmy's study provides a much needed context for such recent and excellent scholarly works as Rufus B. Spain's *At East In Zion: A Social History of Southern Baptists. 1865-1900*.

Hugh C. Davis
Baylor University

The Two Faces of Janus: The Saga of Deep South Change. By J. Oliver Emmerich. (University, Miss.: University and College Press of Mississippi. Pp. 163. \$5.95.)

There is nothing especially novel about the theme with which J. Oliver Emmerich, the distinguished Mississippi editor, opens this absorbing little volume of essays and personal reminiscences, but it is a theme that bears repeating ever so often, if only for the benefit of this new generation of urban Southerners.

Emmerich's basic thesis is that cotton has been the determinant factor in Southern history and that cotton might be likened to the Roman god Janus, a creature of two faces, one face which curses and the other which blesses.

But the irony is, Emmerich believes, that this Cotton Janus inflicted all of his curses upon the South—the curse of “a philosophy intolerent of anything short of conformity; a philosophy of provincialism; a philosophy hostile to change because cotton in the beginning was accepted as for now and evermore; a philosophy of prejudices because it failed to distinguish right and wrong.”

By contrast, whatever blessings the Cotton Janus bestowed went to the American North and even to England, where Southern-produced cotton supplied the raw material for the beginnings of industrial society, not to speak of the capital gained by exporting the product.

Emmerich opens with a brief but fascinating chapter covering the history of cotton, but, after all, the Cotton Janus is as impersonal as the old Roman god himself, so the author moves swiftly into his subject—a scholarly discussion of the residual effects of Janus' curse upon the human population of the region.

Emmerich's subtitle for the book is “The Saga of Deep South Change,” but it becomes quickly apparent that for him, it is a saga of personal change as well.

He has, for example, a chapter entitled “three unforgettable characters.” These turn out to be (three) town blacks he remembers from his youth, and Emmerich's charming vignettes on them are faintly reminiscent of J. G. Baldwin's classic 19th

Century account of life in Alabama and Mississippi, *Flush Times*. One was a comical religious con man of sorts, another the genial town drayman, and the third a woman whose towering strength must have approached that of Ma Joad in *The Grapes of Wrath*. But it was only much later in life—long after the characters were dead—that Emmerich came to realize that each in his own way was struggling, and with some measure of success, to snatch a shred of dignity from a life spent in a scarcely-disguised form of slavery.

Why did he not recognize this when he first witnessed it? Let Emmerich speak for himself:

“To have been born and reared in the Deep South was to accept and embrace its prejudices, not deliberately, nor consciously, not even knowingly, but subconsciously, just as the white-blossomed dogwoods, the redbud trees, and the longleaf yellow pines are accepted as part of the Deep South scenery and as the midnight chorus of the mockingbird and the morning calls of the towhee, the wren, the brown thrasher are accepted as the sounds of the region. The alternative to conformity was to live under the suspicion of disloyalty.”

It is abundantly clear that throughout his life, Emmerich had little tolerance for reactionaries who opposed dipping livestock as a means of stopping the tick epidemic or for vulgar demagogues like James K. Vardaman and Theodore G. Bilbo — on which he has an arresting and often hilarious chapter. And yet, he allowed himself to be swept along by the more respectable reactionaries, those who, while using more polite political rhetoric, nevertheless misled the South around the middle of the Century no less than the demagogues who misled it a few years earlier.

And thus, in part, “The Two Faces of Janus” is a personal confessional error on the part of the author. Although he was among the delegates who bolted the Democratic Convention in 1948 — the celebrated “Dixiecrat year” — Emmerich now regards this dramatic act as sheer folly, dedicated more by emotion and blind adherence to tradition than by logic. When he examined his decision in the cold light of reality, he came to the inevitable conclusion that both political and moral

imperatives of our times dictated that we extend to every citizen the dignity promised him by the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the American tradition.

Having once made this personal commitment, he was the natural person to help lead his community out of the turbulent wilderness of resistance that characterized the early 1960's when his little community of McComb became ignominiously known as "the dynamite capital of the world."

So quite possibly the lasting historical value of this little book will be Emmerich's dispassionate personal account of his lonely personal crusade, in face of boycotts to his newspaper and physical danger to his person—he was once savagely attacked by a stranger in front of his newspaper—to bring about orderly change to a terrorized community. The beauty of the story is that it turned out to be a successful crusade, and Emmerich believes that McComb is a microcosm of what happened in the whole South.

He concludes his odyssey by returning to the Janus theme, but this time casting Janus in the mold of the god of Conformity—which, incidentally, was also a major theme of W. J. Cash's incomparable *Mind of the South*.

"Contrary to what many people believed," he concluded in reflecting over the past 20 troubled years, "a majority of the Deep South residents were not racists. The population was divided between racists and conformists. Included among the racists were the extremists. It is the historical pattern. And not to be forgotten is the fact that conformity is part of the philosophy of backwardness . . .

"What has happened in this region in recent years must be accepted as the achievement of a new enlightenment. It also provides a new freedom for white people who were tied to a pattern of militant conformity. Conformity, unrestrained and uninhibited, becomes a form of slavery. Conformity becomes a master. On numerous occasions throughout the year I have had good men whisper to me at time of heated debates, 'You are right but don't mention my name.' Escape from this master means a new freedom for the white people who were enslaved by it."

I was struck by one brief but remarkable episode related by Emmerich during his battles with the church-bombers. One night a cross was burned on his lawn—by coincidence, a few hours after his elderly mother had died. Shortly afterward an anonymous soul called him to apologize. "We would not have burned that cross in front of your home had we known of your mother's death."

And so perhaps there is another Janus—a Janus of the Southern character, so to speak—a creature with one body and two heads, capable of spastic, mindless violence on the one hand, and yet full of poignant compassion and civility and plain decency on the other.

Ray Jenkins
Alabama Journal

